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ABSTRACT 
Eleven years after the attacks of 9/11, the local fire departments in New York State 
(excluding New York City) have made limited progress toward increasing their 
involvement in the homeland security intelligence enterprise. The New York State (NYS) 
fire service, however, has underutilized potential to be effective contributors, consumers 
and collaborators with regards to intelligence and information sharing. As the threats 
facing the fire service and the citizens it protects continue to evolve, the local NYS fire 
service must build upon NYS’s intelligence strengths and overcome existing gaps.  
This thesis recommends developing and implementing a locally initiated, 
statewide fire service inclusive Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program. Based on four 
factors (effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility, and adaptability), a 
systematic policy options analysis compares three nationally recognized TLO programs 
to determine a recommended NYS TLO program model. A detailed implementation 
strategy is developed to address key stakeholder challenges. This thesis demonstrates that 
instituting a NYS fire service inclusive TLO program will be a catalyst for evolution. 
Increasing the local fire service’s involvement with the homeland security intelligence 
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State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and 
defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United 
States and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into 
account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local, and tribal 
governments and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when undertaking 
the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect 
the United States.1 
- President Ronald Reagan (1981) 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Overview 
Traditionally, the local fire service in New York State (NYS) has not been an 
effective producer or consumer of intelligence information2,3. After the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 (9/11), however, the fire service, “suddenly found itself on the 
front row of the war on terror.”4 Yet, the evolution of NYS’s local fire service into the 
world of intelligence has been slow and challenging. Thirty-one years after President 
Ronald Reagan delivered the above quote and 11 years after the attacks of 9/11, local fire 
departments in New York State (excluding New York City)5 have made limited progress 
toward increasing their involvement in the homeland security intelligence enterprise.  
                                                 
1 Intelligence Guide for First Responders, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Interagency Threat Assessment 
and Coordination Group, 2011), iii. 
2 NOTE: For the purpose of this thesis, intelligence will be based on the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise (FSIE) definition: “All-hazard information that has been gathered and vetted through the 
intelligence cycle in order to generate products that can be used to guide Fire Service decisions at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Also information provided by the Fire Service to the intelligence 
community to support the production of finished intelligence products.” 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing, 2007, 3. 
4 Thomas A Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire 
Service” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 1. 
5 NOTE: Due to the complex nature of the homeland security environment in New York City, this 
analysis will focus on New York State only. 
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In 2004, The 9/11 Commission Report recommended a unity of effort among 
government agencies related to intelligence programs. The commission recognized the 
importance of using an integrated all-source analysis to connect the dots and prevent 
future attacks.6 
On the national level, the federal government asserts that improvements have 
been made in intelligence sharing with locals. In July 2011, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) released Implementing 9/11 Commission Report 
Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. The report highlights homeland security 
changes that have been made in the United States (U.S.) since the release of the 9/11 
Report in 2004. Regarding information sharing, the report states, “Terrorism related 
information sharing across the intelligence community has greatly improved, and through 
the establishment of the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), we have 
strengthened the ability to convey intelligence on threats to the homeland in a context that 
is useful and relevant to law enforcement and homeland security officials at the state and 
local level.”7 
On the state level, New York State asserts that improvements have been made in 
intelligence sharing with the locals. In 2010, The Division of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Services (DHSES) was created. “DHSES and its five offices (Counter 
Terrorism, Cyber Security, Emergency Management, Fire Prevention and Control, and 
Interoperable and Emergency Communications) provide leadership, coordination and 
support for efforts to prevent, protect against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
terrorism and other man-made and natural disasters, threats, fires and other 
emergencies.”8 The DHSES Strategic Plan lists, “sharing information and intelligence 
                                                 
6 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 426. 
7 Department of Homeland Security, Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: 
Progress Report 2011 (Washington, DC, 2011), 11. 
8 New York State, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, “About DHSES,” (n.d.), 
www.dhses.ny.gov/about/index.cfm. 
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with our stakeholders,” and “enhanced customer service” as two of its primary strategic 
goals.9 
On the local level in New York State, however, the fire service (as a major 
DHSES stakeholder) has yet to become a systemic partner in the homeland security 
intelligence enterprise, which is a disservice to the fire service, the intelligence 
community (IC) and the public they strive to protect. The NYS fire service has the 
potential to be effective contributors, consumers and collaborators with regards to 
intelligence and information sharing. 
Across the state, approximately 140,000 fire service personnel respond to over 1.6 
million incidents annually.10,11 As potential contributors of intelligence, each incident is 
an opportunity for fire service personnel12 to interact with the public, and be in private 
homes and businesses. These interactions are unplanned and provide unique opportunities 
for fire service personnel to observe potential signs of terrorist and other illegal 
activities.13 
As potential consumers of intelligence, any of the 1.6 million incidents could 
prove to be a threat to fire service responders or the community at large. Dissemination of 
intelligence to the fire service will guide preparedness activities and increase safety 
during response and recovery operations.14  
 
 
                                                 
9 New York State Homeland Security Strategy (Albany, NY: New York State, 2009), 11. 
10 New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “New York State Fire Resources,” (n.d), 
http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ofpc/documents/fire-resources-list.pdf. 
11 New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, in New York 2009 Summary,” January 13, 
2011, http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ofpc/fire-incident-reporting-system/fire-in-new-york/2009summary.pdf. 
12 NOTE: For the purpose of this thesis, fire service personnel is inclusive of all aspects of the 
discipline (firefighters, fire inspectors, emergency medical technicians, etc.). 
13 The Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (Washington, DC, 2010), 3. 
14 Ibid. 
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As potential collaborators, the fire service brings resources and unique subject 
matter expertise (SME) to the intelligence community. The fire service can advise the IC 
on issues ranging from hazardous materials to critical infrastructure.15 The results would 
be beneficial to all involved. 
2. Current and Evolving Threats 
The fire service has a long history of evolving to meet the needs of the 
communities it serves. The very formation of the formal fire service in the United States 
stemmed from community leaders recognizing the need for a more organized approach to 
fighting building fires. Throughout the decades, specialty programs (emergency medical 
services, technical rescue, hazardous materials response, etc.) were adopted so the fire 
service could better protect itself and the citizenry from traditional threats (fire, life 
threatening medical problems, entrapment, chemical spills, etc.).  
In 2012, the NYS fire service faces a myriad of challenges associated with these 
traditional services. From 1998 to 2009, total responses increased from 905,610 to over 
1.6 million.16,17 Observational data suggests this trend for increasing demands for 
services continues. While the incidents of actual fires have decreased, Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS), for example, have dramatically increased.18 In addition, New 
York State has seen a marked increase in natural disasters. In 2011 alone, New York 
State experienced a record tying four Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
major disaster declarations (severe weather events).19  
In addition to other deviations in these traditional threats, terrorism is the primary 
threat focus of this thesis. The “Future Role of the Fire Service in Homeland Security” 
                                                 
15 The Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 3. 
16 New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “Fire in New York 1998,” (n.d.), 
http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ofpc/fire-incident-reporting-system/fire-in-new-york/98annual.pdf. 
17 New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “Fire in New York 2009 Summary.” 
18 NOTE: Statement based on trends observed in the Fire in New York Summary statistics from 1998 
and 2009. 
19 “FEMA: Annual Major Disaster Declarations Totals,” FEMA | Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, (n.d.), http://coop.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema. 
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determined, “The future role of the fire service in homeland security will demand the 
need for progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence engagement, and the 
adoption of a shifting mission that supports preparedness, prevention, response, and 
recovery of terrorist attacks.”20 
The fire service has not been quick to adapt to the evolving threat of terrorism. On 
February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb placed in a rental truck was detonated in the 
parking garage under the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Six 
people were killed and approximately 1,000 were injured.21 This detonation was the first 
occurrence of Islamic fundamentalists unleashing an attack on American soil.22  
On April 19, 1995, a former United States Army soldier, Timothy McVeigh, 
parked a Ryder truck in front of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. At 9:02 a.m., the homemade explosives detonated, killing 168 people 
(including 19 children) and injuring several hundred.23 McVeigh was labeled by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a, “prototypical lone wolf terrorist” who is 
responsible for the most successful and deadliest domestic terrorist event in the history of 
the United States.24  
While both these events were recognized as major singular incidents, few in the 
fire service identified them as an increasing trend that would soon alter the course of U.S. 
history. For most fire service personnel, an optional three-hour terrorism awareness class 
was the most noticeable outcome of these terrorist attacks. 
 
                                                 
20 Rosemary R. Cloud, “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008), V. 
21 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, 280. 
22 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI 100—1993 Trade Center Bombing,” February 2008, 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608. 
23 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Oklahoma City Bombing,” (n.d.). http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing/. 
24 Nathan R. Springer, “Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of 
Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 13. 
 6
The events of September 11, 2001, however, have profoundly impacted the fire 
service. At 8:46:40 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center in New York City, the response from the Fire Department of New 
York (FDNY) began five seconds later.25 By the end of the day, the FDNY had lost 343 
firefighters and the American fire service found terrorism to be a threat it could no longer 
underestimate. 
While the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are the deadliest to date, national assessments 
indicate threats from domestic and international terrorism remain and are changing. 
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a comprehensive analysis of all 
sources of threats to the United States, it is important to put the current threats into 
context.  
In his July 2012 testimony to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, Rand’s Brian Jenkins presented New Challenges to U.S. 
Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment of Current Terrorist Threats. Jenkins stated, 
“The United States confronts a more diverse terrorist threat in 2012 than it has in the 
past.”26 While he noted a lack of consensus on the current threat posed by al Qaeda, he 
asserted that, “al Qaeda is many things at once—an ideology of violent jihad, a universe 
of like-minded fanatics, a global enterprise—and it operates on a number of fronts in both 
the physical and virtual worlds.” While its ability to execute a 9/11 scale attack is 
reduced, it is focused on, “its ability to inspire and activate homegrown terrorists.”27 
Jenkins continues to outline another terrorist threat of particular concern to the 
local fire service in New York, the anarchist. Inspired by the economic crisis and an ever-
increasing political divide, the number of legitimate protests is increasing in the United 
States. These protests will often, “attract violence-prone anarchists who see them as 
opportunities to escalate confrontations with police and foment riots.” For example, 
                                                 
25 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, 289. 
26 Brian M. Jenkins, New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts An Assessment of the Current 
Terrorist Threat, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
United States Senate, July 11, 2012, 1. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
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“Investigators in New York have linked anarchists to a series of small bombings in the 
city in 2005, 2007, and 2008.”28  
In 2010, the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) produced The Vigilant 
Project: An Analysis of 32 Terrorist Cases Against the Homeland. To gain a better 
understanding of the current terrorist threat, the NYSIC reviewed 32 post 9/11 terror plots 
and attempted attacks against the United States. Four key findings are relevant to the 
evolving role of the local fire service in New York State. First, one-third of the cases in 
the report involved terrorist attacks within New York State, or from a terrorist cell based 
within.29 Since New York City (NYC) continues to be a symbolic target, local 
communities in and around it will be staging areas or targets of convenience. 
Second, the threat of homegrown terrorism is significant. Half the individuals 
studied in the Vigilant Project report were U.S. citizens (70% were natural born).30 
Whether inspired by an outside group or self radicalized, the origin of the next attack in 
the United States could come from any house on the block. 
Third, transportation systems and military installations remain valuable targets. 
Of the cases studied, two-thirds fall into these categories.31 New York State has several 
major military installations within its borders and all methods of transportation systems 
crisscross the state. 
Lastly, the use of explosives remains a common tactic in U.S.-based terrorist 
plots.32 Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and other forms of 
explosives are effective terrorist tools. Fire service personnel will be among the first 
responders post-blast or when preparations go awry. 
                                                 
28 Jenkins, New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts An Assessment of the Current Terrorist 
Threat, 8. 
29 The Vigilant Project: An Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases Against the Homeland (Albany, NY: New 
York State Intelligence Center, 2010), 5. 




All these evolving threats, along with more routine fire, rescue and medical calls, 
provide NYS’s 140,000 fire service personnel an opportunity to interact with the public, 
and be in private homes and businesses.33 Each of the 1.6 million incidents is an 
unplanned interaction that provides unique opportunities for properly trained fire service 
personnel to observe potential signs of terrorist and other illegal activities.34  
3. The Core Problem 
While the NYS fire service has underutilized potential to be contributors, 
consumers and collaborators with the intelligence community, in a time of competing 
priorities and shrinking budgets, it is unlikely that increasing the intelligence capabilities 
of the local fire service in New York State will occur from top-down (federal or state) 
initiatives. For the local fire service in New York State to be a more effective partner in 
the homeland security intelligence enterprise, a locally initiated solution must be 
proposed. Each day, 140,000 fire service personnel are responding to incidents across 
New York State, but lack the training and connection to the IC to protect themselves and 
the populations they serve fully from the multitude of threats they face. 
B.  SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis addresses the question: how should the local NYS fire service’s role 
within the IC evolve? 
While considering the evolving threats, this thesis explores the need for an 
increased local fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise through a top-down 
and bottom-up approach.35,36 The top-down approach is reflected in relevant federal and 
NYS doctrine presented in the literature review that builds the basic foundation for the 
need for information sharing (specifically with local partners). 
                                                 
33 New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “New York State Fire Resources.” 
34 The Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 3. 
35 NOTE: It is not the intent of this document to consider information that would be “classified” by the 
United States Presidential Executive Order 13526 (Classified National Security Information). 
36 E.O. 13526 of 12/29/10, 75 FR 1013. 
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The bottom-up needs are explored through a review of current surveys of fire 
service practitioners. The primary sources are Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
(CHDS) thesis survey results and a 2012 Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination 
Group (ITACG) fire service intelligence survey.  
For the local fire service in New York State to evolve its role in the homeland 
security intelligence enterprise, existing efforts in New York State are first identified and 
examined. Strengths and gaps are incorporated into the analysis and recommendations.  
As an effective and efficient way to build upon NYS’s strengths and overcome 
gaps, developing and implementing a locally initiated, statewide fire service inclusive 
Terrorism Liaison Officer37 (TLO) program is the primary recommendation. Three 
established TLO programs that contain a fire service component are identified and 
examined to determine good practices. Practices analyzed include program structure, 
administration, roles and responsibilities, costs, and training requirements. Based on 
proposed NYS factors (effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility and 
adaptability), a systematic policy options analysis compares the three TLO programs to 
determine their areas of strength and weaknesses as related to the New York experience. 
Based on the evaluation, one existing TLO program is recommended as a model for New 
York State to use to develop its own statewide fire service inclusive TLO program. A 
detailed implementation strategy is developed to address key stakeholder challenges. 
C.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Three research methods are used to explore the evolving intelligence role of the 
New York State local fire service in the homeland security intelligence enterprise: 
document analysis, participant observer information gathering, and policy option 
analysis. Document analysis is used to examine federal, New York State, and academic 
documents that discuss the role and establish the need for local fire service involvement. 
                                                 
37 NOTE: As illustrated by the thesis title, a final recommendation of this thesis is to name the NYS 
program: Threat Liaison Officer. To reduce confusion and based on the names of the three programs used 
in the program options analysis, this thesis will use the term Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) until the final 
recommendation is made. 
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As a participant observer in the local fire service in New York State for over 20 
years, personal observations and communications supplement documentation in various 
areas of research. Since 2004, this author has held a leadership role in a county 
Hazardous Material Response Team (HMRT). Through this role, the author has frequent 
contact with state and national homeland security representatives. In this capacity, the 
author identified an intelligence gap and began exploring methods and systems to 
increase the role of the local fire service in the intelligence community. This thesis has 
allowed professional and academic endeavors to support and complement one another. 
As a participant observer, the author identified three good practice TLO programs 
that have enabled other local fire service organizations to connect with the intelligence 
enterprise. Policy option analysis is used to evaluate these programs. 
Practices to be examined include program structure, administration, roles and 
responsibilities, cost, and training requirements. Specific factors—effectiveness, 
efficiency, political and legal feasibility and adaptability—are compared critically across 
programs because of their importance to NYS’s interest and ability in adopting a TLO 
program. Based on this analysis, an individual TLO program is identified as a 
recommended framework of a TLO program for New York State. Implementation 
recommendations based on NYS institutional (state and local) structures and the current 
fiscal climate are included. 
This thesis is written in a manner to allow it to be published as an open source 
document. The author feels the benefits of unrestricted distribution to a wide range of 
stakeholders outweigh a slightly more in-depth exploration of sensitive documents that 
may reveal a minutely clearer picture of fusion center or TLO program’s inner workings. 
D.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II is the literature review for this thesis. Homeland security as a field of 
study is relatively new. The depth of the material related to the role of the fire service is 




documents and CHDS academic theses. Federal and NYS doctrine that build the basic 
foundation for the need for information sharing, specifically with local partners, are 
identified.  
Academic works that examine the evolving role of the fire service in the 
intelligence enterprise are outlined using the FBI intelligence cycle as a guide. Few 
academic works examine TLO programs in any depth. 
Chapter III begins with an introduction of the TLO concept. The intra-disciplinary 
desire for fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise is gauged. The chapter 
continues with an assessment of the existing NYS fire intelligence enterprise. Federal and 
state organizations and initiatives that currently interact with the local fire service are 
identified and critiqued to determine strengths and gaps with current practices. The 
asserted impact of instituting a TLO program is previewed. 
Chapter IV proposes the development of a TLO program as a policy initiative to 
build upon strengths and address gaps in the existing NYS fire intelligence enterprise. 
Three nationally recognized TLO programs (Arizona, Colorado and Los Angeles) 
undergo a formal program analysis. Each program is examined via the four evaluation 
factors of effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility, and adaptability. Each 
of the four factors is divided into five criteria. Each criterion is then rated low, medium or 
high based on the developed matrix. The results are scored, weighted and used to rank the 
three programs. A detailed explanation of the policy options analysis process is included. 
Chapter V outlines specific recommendations and implementation strategies. 
Based on the policy options analysis, this chapter provides a recommended framework 
for a TLO program for local fire service in New York State. Included are specific 
implementation recommendations based on NYS institutional (state and local) structures, 
and the current fiscal climate. The chapter closes with the thesis conclusion. 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we 
created them. 
- Albert Einstein 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This literature review focuses on evolving the local fire service intelligence 
enterprise in New York State by examining related policy and research initiatives. 
Specifically, it identifies and analyzes relevant U.S. and NYS government documents that 
discuss the current and potential role of the local fire service in the intelligence 
enterprise.38 Secondly, the review examines relevant academic research that examines the 
evolution of the fire service in the intelligence enterprise. Lastly, the review identifies 
areas in which knowledge gaps remain and future research should be considered. 
B.  DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 
While several definitions of intelligence exist, for the purpose of this thesis, the 
term “information sharing or intelligence” is acquired from the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise (FSIE): 
All-hazard information that has been gathered and vetted through the 
intelligence cycle in order to generate products that can be used to guide 
Fire Service decisions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Also 
information provided by the Fire Service to the intelligence community to 
support the production of finished intelligence products.39 
                                                 
38 NOTE: Several NYS and federal entities are briefly introduced in the literature review. Many are 
reviewed in greater depth in Chapter III. 
39 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing, 3. 
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It is not the intent of this document to consider information that would be 
“classified” by the United States Presidential Executive Order 13526 (Classified National 
Security Information).40 
C.  REVIEW OF FEDERAL DOCUMENTS 
The 9/11 Report is the foundation from which modern U.S. homeland security 
initiatives and literature have been born. The report recommends a unity of effort among 
government agencies to collect intelligence information. The commission recognized the 
importance of using an integrated all-source analysis to connect the dots and prevent 
future attacks.41The 9/11 Report fell short, however, in making specific recommendations 
regarding the role of the fire service in the intelligence enterprise. 
Several federal documents describe the overall architecture of the current 
homeland security initiative in the United States. Each plays a part in creating a 
foundational argument that the fire service should expand its mission and be a partner in 
the intelligence enterprise. As illustrated, however, all fall short of making a direct 
mandate. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) is 
one of the first post-9/11 directives to provide structure to the homeland security project. 
Although devised as a reaction to terrorism, HSPD-8 takes an all-hazard approach to 
preparation. A significant aspect of its purpose is, “establishing mechanisms for 
improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and local government, and 
outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State and local 
entities,”42 which led to the development of the National Preparedness Guidelines and 
Target Capabilities List. While these documents are an attempt to synchronize the 
national effort toward preparedness, one of its most significant impacts is its goal to, 
                                                 
40 E.O. 13526 of 12/29/10, 75 FR 1013. 
41 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, 426. 
42 George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2003), 1. 
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“Guide national investments in national preparedness.”43 The Target Capabilities List is 
the standards by which grants funds are disseminated to state and local partners. As is 
illustrated in the review of NYS documents, grant funds based on these target capabilities 
had the largest impact on the development of homeland security response capabilities and 
policy development on the state and local levels. Intelligence and information sharing is a 
capability considered to be a common mission area and multi-disciplinary.44 
The executive branch, to outline for Congress the major national security 
concerns for the United States, periodically produces the National Security Strategy. In 
the latest version (May 2010), the threat of international terrorism is a major theme. The 
document focused on the need for a whole government approach to national security. 
Specifically, it emphasizes the need for an evolution and integration of the intelligence 
capacity of the United States. In addition, it states, “And we must integrate our approach 
to homeland security with our broader national security approach.”45 No fire service 
specific references are mentioned. 
The National Intelligence Strategy comes from the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI). It describes the DNI’s plan for overhauling the U.S. 
intelligence community. The document speaks indirectly to the intelligence needs of the 
fire service through the strategy’s enterprise objectives. The first involves enhancing 
community mission management. The DNI is looking to develop products that meet 
needs on the operations level.46 Secondly, the strategy states the need to, “Establish new 
partnerships. Build mutual trust and a shared understanding of needs, capabilities, and 
missions with partners, particularly those with whom the IC has traditionally not had a 
                                                 
43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines (Washington, DC, 
2007), 1. 
44 Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines (Ft. Belvoir: 
Defense Technical Information Center, 2007), 69. 
45 National Security Strategy (Washington: White House, 2010), 14. 
46 The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical 
Information Center, 2009), 11. 
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relationship.”47 Again, The National Intelligence Strategy does not specifically mention 
the fire service as a potential collaboration partner.  
In the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework 
for a Secure Homeland (QHSR), the DHS executed its congressional mandate to outline 
homeland security priorities, “for the homeland security enterprise as a whole.”48 The 
QHSR discusses the need for shared intelligence and information throughout the 
document. Specific references illustrate the need for intelligence to be shared to enhance 
mission readiness.49 While falling short of specifically mentioning the need for the fire 
service to be included, it uses inclusive language, such as, “homeland security 
partners.”50 It is emphasized at the beginning of the document that local government 
(which the fire service is a key component) is an important partner in the homeland 
security enterprise.51  
In addition to the QHSR, DHS developed a separate Information Sharing Strategy 
Report (ISSR). A key principal in the ISSR is that “fostering information sharing is a core 
DHS mission.”52 Similarly, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence also 
developed a guideline entitled, Strategic Intent for Information Sharing. A key 
philosophy in the document is the goal developed by the DNI to transition the IC from a 
“need-to-know” to a “need to share” environment.53 Both documents develop a tone of 
inclusiveness, but do not mention the fire service as a specific partner in information 
sharing. 
In July 2011, the U.S. DHS released Implementing 9/11 Commission Report 
Recommendations: Progress Report 2011. The report highlights homeland security 
                                                 
47 National Intelligence Strategy, 13. 
48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A 
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: 2010), V. 
49 Ibid., 67. 
50 Ibid., 38. 
51 Ibid., iii. 
52 Department of Homeland Security, Information Sharing Strategy Report, 2008, 5.  
53 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Strategic Intent for Information Sharing 
(Washington, DC, 2011), 5. 
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changes made in the United States since the release of the 9/11 Report in 2004. 
Regarding information sharing, the report states: “Terrorism related information sharing 
across the intelligence community has greatly improved, and through the establishment of 
the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), we have strengthened the ability to 
convey intelligence on threats to the homeland in a context that is useful and relevant to 
law enforcement and homeland security officials at the state and local level.”54 
In a specific reference to the fire service, the report states that implementation of 
fusion centers have increased front-line personnel (including fire) to understand better the 
implications of national intelligence to better protect communities.55  
Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (FSIFC) creates a detailed 
outline on how to integrate the fire service successfully into a fusion center. Most 
importantly, it is a significant document in that it creates a detailed picture of how the fire 
service can both contribute to and be a consumer of intelligence: “The integration of fire 
service organizations and personnel into the fusion process enhances the efforts of all 
homeland security partners across all mission areas.”56 Unlike the previous mentioned 
documents that made indirect references, FSIFC makes a coherent and cohesive 
argument that the fire service is an active member of the intelligence enterprise. 
The last federal documentation comes from the ITACG, which is part of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The mission of the NCTC is to, “Lead our 
nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing 
that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to 
ensure unity of effort.”57 As part of the NCTC, ITACG’s mission is to, “…facilitate the 
production and timely issuance of terrorism-related interagency products for distribution 
                                                 
54 Department of Homeland Security, Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: 
Progress Report 2011, 11. 
55 Ibid., 12. 
56 The Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 2. 
57 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “NCTC: Strategic Intent,” (n.d.), 
http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/strategic_intent.html. 
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to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector (SLTP) partners.”58 To facilitate this mission, 
the ITACG publishes the Intelligence Guide for First Responders (IGFR). The IGFR is a 
guidebook to introduce first responders to the world of intelligence. It covers the basic 
terminology and the elements of the intelligence cycle.59 In addition to teaching first 
responders (including fire service) basic intelligence information, it also legitimizes them 
as part of the intelligence enterprise.  
D.  REVIEW OF NEW YORK STATE DOCUMENTS 
Four documents illustrate the evolution of homeland security and the fire service 
in New York State since 9/11. All four documents illustrate the fire service’s potential 
impact on the intelligence and information sharing enterprise.  
The New York State Homeland Security Strategy (NYSHSS) “provides a 
comprehensive framework to guide, organize and unify homeland security efforts in New 
York State, including strategic planning and the investment of federal homeland security 
grants and other applicable local, State or federal funding sources.”60 As mentioned in the 
federal document section, federal grant funding is a major driving force in the 
development of state strategies. New York State is no exception. The NYSHSS references 
and reflects the National Preparedness Guidelines and Target Capabilities List. 
Subsequently, intelligence and information sharing is a capability highlighted in the 
NYSHSS as a common mission area and multi-disciplinary.61  
The New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services 
Strategic Plan (DHSES Strategic Plan) defines the strategic plans for the newly formed 
(July 2010) state agency. By combining and creating relevant homeland security 
agencies, DHSES centralized and focused the homeland security mission in New York 
State. Specific to the intelligence needs of the fire service, DHSES contains the Office of 
                                                 
58 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group 
(ITACG),” (n.d.), http://www.nctc.gov/itacg/itacg_roles_and_responsibilities.html. 
59 Intelligence Guide for First Responders, 18. 
60 New York State Homeland Security Strategy, 1. 
61 Ibid., 3. 
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Counter Terrorism (OCT) and the Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC). These 
two agencies are central to the current and future role of the NYS fire service’s role in the 
NYS intelligence community. The DHSES Strategic Plan lists, “sharing information and 
intelligence with our stakeholders,” and “enhanced customer service” as two of its 
primary strategic goals.62 The NYSHSS and the DHSES Strategic Plan both create a 
philosophical environment in which an expanded fire service role would be welcome and 
strategically supported. As similarly noted in the federal documents, philosophical 
support without legal mandate is a clear theme in the New York State literature as well. 
The last two documents to reference are OFPC publications entitled New York 
State Fire Resources (NYFR) and Fire in New York that are updated annually to reflect 
the situational status of the NYS fire service (call type and number, personnel, etc.). As 
noted in Chapter I, the fire service has the potential to be a force multiplier in the 
intelligence enterprise. 
The first two NYS documents show the strategic and philosophical support for 
increasing the fire service involvement with intelligence and information sharing. The 
last two documents illustrate the incredible potential. 
E.  REVIEW OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
The primary source of academic research related to fire service involvement with 
the intelligence enterprise comes from the CHDS at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). CHDS theses illustrate the evolution of academic thinking on the topic. Early 
works, as illustrated with the first three citations below, focused on asking the question—
should the fire service be involved with the information and intelligence sharing 
enterprise. Later works focus on how. While CHDS is a multi-disciplinary program, only 
fire service officers authored the following fire-themed contributions. Since the academic 
discipline of homeland security is in its infancy, most authors have focused their research 
on topics that complement their area of expertise and meet the emergent demands of their 
agencies.  
                                                 
62 New York State Homeland Security Strategy, 11. 
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The most comprehensive study of the role of the fire service in the intelligence 
and information-sharing environment is “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where 
Are the Information Sharing Boundaries?” The work provides a broad based analysis of 
the larger question of should the fire service expand its role to include intelligence. The 
major conclusion is, “… U.S. firefighters have legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to 
gather and share potential terrorist-related information that could assist the homeland 
security community in preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks.”63 The work continues 
to make recommendations on implementation strategies and best practices.64  
The Future Role of the Fire Service in Homeland Security uses the Delphi method 
(structured questions to a panel of experts) to also examine the question of fire service 
evolution. The work determines, “The future role of the fire service in homeland security 
will demand the need for progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence 
engagement, and the adoption of a shifting mission that supports preparedness, 
prevention, response, and recovery of terrorist attacks.”65  
The need for intelligence engagement is also a conclusion of “Strategic Changes 
for the Fire Service in the Post 9/11 Era.” Specifically, it uses formative evaluation and 
policy analysis to reach its recommendations. One main recommendation is, “…the fire 
service must engage in intelligence activities in order to maximize situational awareness, 
and be effective at planning and budgeting.”66 
While the need for fire service involvement is briefly reinforced in the next 
academic works, the major focus is on how the fire service should implement the various 
steps of the intelligence cycle.67,68 
                                                 
63 Bryan Heirston, “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where Are the Information-Sharing 
Boundaries?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 105. 
64 Ibid., 107. 
65 Cloud, “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security,” V. 
66 Douglas M. Weeks, “Strategic Changes for the Fire Service in the Post- 9/11 Era” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), V. 
67 NOTE: The FBI Intelligence Cycle contains the following six steps: Requirements, Planning, 
Collection, Processing, Analysis and Dissemination.  
68 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Intelligence Cycle,” (n.d.), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle. 
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“Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire 
Service” presents a limited overview of a shortened intelligence cycle (Requirements–
Collection–Analysis–Dissemination). Basis intelligence requirement issues are examined, 
with each fire department needing to develop its own requirements being the main 
conclusion.69 Elements of the other three steps in the shortened intelligence cycle are 
overviewed. As the title implies, the major focus of the work is incorporating and training 
fire service members to utilize open source intelligence.  
In addition, a thesis in process at CHDS is entitled “Intelligence Requirements of 
the Fire Service for Tactical and Strategic Decision Making,” but is not currently 
published.70 As a baseline of needs (and the first step in the intelligence cycle), this is a 
very important topic for future research.  
Limited academic information is available for the second step of planning. 
General policy directives could be obtained on this step from the ITACG at the NCTC or 
the NYSIC. The NYSIC is NYS’s fusion center, and it is also an area in which future 
research is needed. 
“Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence 
Gatherers” asserts that despite legal, cultural and training challenges, firefighters as 
intelligence gatherers are an, “opportunity for firefighters to act as ‘first preventers’ in the 
war on terrorism.”71 The work provides a detailed analysis and a coherent argument that 
all the challenges can be overcome. Unlike the first thesis that advocated the use of open 
source information only, this work advocates training firefighters to collect intelligence 
actively during the course of their regular duties.  
The next steps of processing and analyzing data have received limited academic 
attention as it relates to the fire service. Much of the research work done on fusion 
                                                 
69 Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire Service,” 36. 
70 “Intelligence Requirements of the Fire Service for Tactical and Strategic Decision Making,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming), (n.d.). 
https://www.chds.us/?thesiscenter/summary&done=current& keyword=fire&best=Any&cohort=Any. 
71 Richard J. Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence 
Gatherers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), V. 
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centers and general intelligence analysis is transferable to fire service members who may 
be assigned to the ITACG or a fusion center. 
The final step in the intelligence cycle is dissemination. “Identifying Best 
Practices in Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS 
Services” does an excellent job of presenting and analyzing the various methods available 
and preferred. The work uses structured interviews and a survey to answer the question, 
“how can information and intelligence be better disseminated to local first responders to 
enhance situational awareness, provide a higher degree of responder safety, and better 
protect the public?”72 
While no CHDS thesis is dedicated to examining a TLO program, several theses 
present the TLO concept as a mechanism for increasing fire service involvement in the 
intelligence enterprise. Two go to greater depth. “Identifying Best Practices in 
Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” surveys 
select fire service representatives regarding a TLO program. Ultimately, fire service 
organizations instituting a TLO program is a key recommendation.73 
“Terrorism Information Management within the New York City Fire Department: 
Past, Present and Future” discusses the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(ACTIC) TLO program history and real world success stories. In addition, TLO lessons 
learned are outlined.74 
F.  CONCLUSION 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, homeland security organizations 
in the United States have been developing and evolving to meet the demands of the 
varied threats. The documents produced by the federal and NYC governments provide 
strategic goals and operational structure for much of this evolutionary process. Eleven 
                                                 
72 Thomas J. Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First 
Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), V.  
73 Ibid., 60. 
74 John P. Flynn, “Terrorism Information Management within the New York City Fire Department 
Past, Present and Future” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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years after the 9/11 attacks, however, the local fire service is still struggling to evolve. 
The literature reinforces its response role and creates a strong philosophical foundation 
for the need for an expanded role into areas, such as intelligence and information sharing. 
The lack of clear and direct language or a legal mandate, however, is limiting forward 
movement. 
Academic research is creating a cogent argument for an expanded fire service 
role, but progress has been slow and incremental. As illustrated by the examination of the 
intelligence cycle research, gaps still remain as to how the fire service can fulfill an 
intelligence mission. The pending thesis on intelligence requirements for the fire service 
will be vital in identifying intelligence needs specific to the fire service (the first step in 
the cycle). Academic research on the fire service’s role in planning, processing and 
intelligence analysis is still needed to fill the knowledge gap related to the intelligence 
cycle alone. 
Chapter III introduces the TLO concept and an overview of the need for a 
program in New York State. The chapter discusses a myriad of NYS and federal agencies 
that impact the fire service role in the intelligence enterprise. This thesis asserts that gaps 
exist between the services these agencies provide, and the locals who may or may not be 
connected to those services. While the proposed TLO program is one solution to increase 
the local connection to existing federal programs (FSIE, ITACG etc.), other possible 
resolutions are an additional area for future study. Research must continue to fill the 
knowledge gaps and expand the fire service role in the intelligence enterprise. 
 24
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III ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR A TLO PROGRAM 
The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 
9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can 
be prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves on 
the front lines. We must plan for this eventuality. A rededication to 
preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we 
lost that day.75 
- 9/11 Commission Report 
A.  OVERVIEW  
As outlined in the literature review in Chapter II, relevant federal and NYS 
doctrine construct the basic foundation of need for increased information sharing with the 
local fire service. This chapter builds upon this foundation by examining the current 
information-sharing environment for the local fire service in New York State. The 
chapter begins with a brief introduction of the TLO concept. Survey instruments are 
examined to assess local fire service interest in increased information sharing. Lastly, 
pertinent NYS and federal homeland security entities are evaluated to identify strengths 
and gaps related to information sharing While Chapter IV explores the TLO program in 
depth, the impact of the proposed TLO plan is previewed in this chapter. 
B.  TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER (TLO) INTRODUCTION 
The TLO concept was first developed in the South Bay area of southern 
California in 2002. Redondo Beach leadership brought together area police chiefs to form 
a Terrorism Advisory Committee (TAC). Goals of the TAC were, “First, it should 
integrate with and fully complement existing or emerging efforts at the federal, state and 
                                                 
75 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, 323. 
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local levels—avoiding duplication of effort. Second, it should be capable of examining 
and developing a response to Redondo Beach’s unique needs.”76  
One of the early programs developed by the TAC was the country’s first TLO 
program. The TAC recognized it was essential to designate and train qualified individuals 
to address the unfolding threat. “The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) serves as the key 
link for each agency in all matters related to terrorism.”77 The program quickly spread to 
other law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County. The California Peace Officer 
Standards and Training (POST) Commission identified the program as a best practice for 
the entire state. The emerging TLO concept, touted in professional journals and national 
conferences, was soon introduced across the nation. To the credit of the TAC and the 
benefit of the fire service, they recognized early on that the TLO program should be 
multi-disciplinary.78 
The TLO initiative has spread and advanced through various jurisdictions across 
the country. As first envisioned by the TAC, each new authority that adapted the concept 
has modified the program to meet its collective needs. Typical TLO duties and 
responsibilities include the following. 
 “The collecting, reporting, retrieving, and sharing of materials 
related to terrorism. 
 The source person for internal or external inquiry. 
 The contact for communicating with community stakeholders in 
matters related to terrorism. 
 The contact person for community and private sector relationships. 
 The person who conducts, coordinates, and/or facilitates 
departmental training with regard to terrorism and terrorist related 
subjects. 
 The person who conducts, coordinates, and/or facilitates 
community meetings, conferences, and other information sharing 
activities. 
                                                 
76 Gregory C. Hill. “U.S. Mayor Article | Best Practices: Redondo Beach Mobilizes After 9-11 for 





 The designated agency representative to the JTTF, Terrorism Early 
Warning Group (TEW), or Fusion Center.”79 
As illustrated by the list of typical duties, a TLO program is a recognized mechanism to 
better connect an agency with the IC. 
C.  FIRE SERVICE SELF-ASSESSED NEEDS 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. fire service has recognized its need to 
become more involved in the intelligence enterprise. Initial inroads were sporadic and 
often based on personal versus systemic relationships. One of the first comprehensive 
attempts to formalize the fire service’s involvement was the formation of the FSIE. “The 
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A)-coordinated FSIE initiative is a 
national strategic approach to information sharing between the U.S. fire service and 
homeland security community.” The FSIE is a, “strategic extension and formal expansion 
of the current informal fire service information-sharing environment between the fire 
service and homeland security communities.”80 While the current status of the FSIE is 
discussed in the next section, its formation illustrates the desire of the local fire service to 
be more involved in the intelligence enterprise. 
Two CHDS theses used survey instruments to assess the fire services needs 
related to intelligence. The picture they create is one of a first response partner that 
desires intelligence, but is often lacking the means to obtain it. 
In a 2008 survey of 32 fire chiefs who considered firefighters as potential 
intelligence gatherers, 81% felt, “training firefighters to recognize non-conventional, 
potential terrorist threats during the performance of their duties would enhance the 
homeland security of the United States.”81 In addition, 92% of this same group would be 
willing to utilize their own resources to initialize and complete the process.82  
                                                 
79 Joint Regional Intelligence Center, “What is a TLO?” Terrorism Liaison Officer Information 
Network, (n.d.). http://www.tlo.org/what_is_tlo.html. 
80 Bryan Heirston, “Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?” Homeland 
Security Affairs 6, no. 2 (May 2010), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=6.2.6. 
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82 Ibid., 20. 
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In a 2010 survey of 30 fire chiefs, “All of the respondents answered they would 
benefit from regular intelligence briefings.”83 Specifically, 90% indicated intelligence 
briefings would affect their daily operations.84 As to the reason, “eighty-three percent 
(83%) of the respondents are interested in receiving intelligence that can assist them in 
preparation activities. Receiving information on specific threats, the types of materials 
used, and the modalities and tactics used, allows responders to develop appropriate 
training programs and purchase equipment that enables them to minimize risks to 
responders and the public.” 85 
In a 2012 nationwide survey, the FSIE and the ITACG, “initiated the First 
Responder Field Survey to gauge the effectiveness of current intelligence production and 
dissemination in meeting the needs of US fire and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) 
departments.” They surveyed 491 fire/EMS departments in nine targeted regions on their 
“level of familiarity with commonly used intelligence products.” The conclusion of the 
survey is, “a strong need to increase awareness of available intelligence products among 
the fire/EMS services.” In addition, it “indicated a strong interest in a fire-centric 
intelligence product.”86 
The CHDS, FSIE and ITACG survey results illustrate the need for evolution in 
the local fire service. The fire service has a desire for intelligence information, but is 
unaware of existing methods to obtain it. The TLO program provides a mechanism for 
the fire service to engage its homeland security partners as contributors, consumers, and 
collaborators of intelligence. 
D.  ASSESSING NEW YORK STATE FIRE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 
An assertion of this thesis is that the evolution of the local fire service in the 
intelligence enterprise must be a bottom-up initiative. Consequently, it is essential to have 
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84 Ibid., 40. 
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an understanding of the existing state and federal systems that currently facilitate fire 
service involvement in the intelligence enterprise. 
The 2010 establishment of the NYS DHSES, “represents one of the most 
significant public safety reorganizations in New York State history.”87 By combining and 
creating relevant homeland security agencies, DHSES centralized and focused the 
homeland security mission in New York State. Specific to the intelligence needs of the 
fire service, DHSES contains the OCT and the OFPC. These two agencies are central to 
the current and future role of the NYS fire service’s role in the NYS IC. The DHSES 
Strategic Plan lists “sharing information and intelligence with our stakeholders,” and 
“enhanced customer service” as two of its primary strategic goals.88 While the DHSES 
Strategic Plan creates a philosophical environment in which an expanded fire service role 
would be welcome and strategically supported, gaps remain.  
In conjunction with DHSES, the New York State Police (NYSP) holds primary 
responsibilities for intelligence related activities in New York State. In addition to street 
level operational interactions, the NYSP operates NYS’s fusion center and coordinates 
statewide counterterrorism initiatives through 16 Counterterrorism Zones (CTZ). 
The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) is the primary fusion center for 
New York State.89 Established in 2003, the NYSIC coordinates all statewide intelligence 
activities.90 Based in the state capital of Albany, the “all-crimes” versus “all-hazards” 
fusion center is predominantly law enforcement-centric. NYSP (uniformed and civilian) 
and DHSES intelligence analysts primarily staff the NYSIC. As illustrated by Table 1, 
other agencies have representation privileges in the center. 
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NYSIC AGENCY REPRESENTATION 
Albany Police Department (NY) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York State Police (NYSP) 
NYC Dept. of Environmental Protection NY Air National Guard 
NY Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
PD 
NYS Banking Department 
NYS Dept. of Correctional Services NYS Department of Motor Vehicles 
NYS Division of Parole NYS Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Services 
Schenectady County Probation 
Department 
Social Security Administration 
U.S. Attorney’s Office (Northern District 
of NY) 
U.S. Border Patrol 
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration 
U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement 
NY Army National Guard 
Table 1.   NYSIC Agency Representation91 
Table 1 illustrates how minimal fire service representation is in the NYSIC. 
Currently, it is represented through DHSES. In October 2007, prior to the creation of 
DHSES, the OCT created a Fire and EMS Coordinator position. The position acted as a 
liaison between OCT and OFPC (then part of the NYS Department of State). The 
position also represented the interests of the two disciplines (fire and EMS) within the 
NYS homeland security community. A component of the position was to educate 
traditional members of the IC (law enforcement, intelligence analysts, etc.) on the needs 
of the fire service and EMS. The Coordinator and an OFPC Deputy Chief (who was 
assigned as the liaison to the OCT) were the first fire service representatives assigned to 
the NYSIC.92 
In December 2011, the individual who held the Fire and EMS Coordinator 
position was appointed Deputy State Fire Administrator for OFPC. Since OCT and OFPC 
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92 Briefing at 2011 NYS Hazardous Materials Leadership Forum, Lake Placid, NY, October 22, 2011.  
 31
are now in the same division of state government (per the 2010 establishment of 
DHSES), the need for an OCT liaison was no longer needed. A second order effect of the 
elimination of this position is a 50% reduction in fire service representation in the 
NYSIC. The current NYSIC liaison responsibilities continue to be held by the OFPC 
Deputy Chief first assigned. While this individual recognizes the importance of fire 
service representation, his NYSIC assignment is among a myriad of other homeland 
security and hazardous material responsibilities, which limits the amount of time spent on 
fire service intelligence related matters. While DHSES shows a conceptual commitment 
to the intelligence needs of the local fire service, limited fire service representation to the 
NYSIC is a major gap. The creation of a TLO program will eventually lead to additional 
fire service resources becoming available to the NYSIC.  
Of particular interest to the fire service are the NYSIC’s development of 
Safeguard New York, the production of CrossFIRE, and the implementation of a Field 
Intelligence Officer (FIO) course. 
Safeguard New York is NYS’s version of the national See Something Say 
Something program. Similar to the national program, Safeguard New York is intended to 
educate residents on how to report suspicious activity to law enforcement. “The New 
York State Office of Homeland Security, in conjunction with law enforcement agencies 
throughout New York State, is reaching out to businesses, organizations, and 
communities to create a better public awareness of potential terrorist indicators and 
suspicious activities. This outreach promotes the recognition and reporting of potential 
terrorist activities within the community.”93 To date, no specific training program exists 
for fire service personnel on the Safeguard New York initiative. A major component of a 
TLO program is providing terrorism awareness training to line fire service personnel. An 
element of this training will include procedures for reporting observed suspicious 
activities. 
CrossFIRE (Public Safety & Health Field Intelligence Report) is NYS’s initiative 
to share unclassified intelligence information with first responders (fire, EMS, health, 
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Hazmat, emergency management and law enforcement) through an electronically 
distributed intelligence-sharing document. “CrossFIRE is a new intelligence product to 
support the Fire and EMS communities, developed by the NYSIC, that communicates 
important information, timely, ‘need to know’ information to NYS’s first responders via 
county fire and EMS coordinators. This focused NYS perspective supported by analysis 
and application of relevant information from other first responders resources, educates 
New York’s Fire, EMS and health communities with information to confront emerging 
threats.”94 
This joint effort between the NYSIC and DHSES is distributed on an as-needed 
basis with the intent to “make information concerning terrorism trends and responder 
safety available to all first responders.”95 While the “unclassified/for official use only” 
(FOUO) information is primarily a collection of open-source intelligence, it provides a 
foundation from which to build a stronger relationship between the NYS IC and the fire 
service. 
CrossFIRE provides an excellent, although sometimes sporadic, vehicle to 
disseminate intelligence information to NYS fire service members. However, no 
corresponding training program to educate fire service members on how to implement 
and act upon the information they receive exists. The TLO program provides a cadre of 
trained individuals who will know how to act upon CrossFIRE information. In addition, 
the training the TLOs provide to line fire service personnel will increase their individual 
level of awareness. Lastly, an active TLO program will help develop more accurate fire 
service intelligence requirements (the first step in the intelligence cycle) that will lead to 
a more effective CrossFIRE product.  
The NYSIC currently has a Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) program specifically 
designed for law enforcement. The FIO program is a four-hour awareness training that 
focuses on connecting local law enforcement with the analytical capabilities of the 
NYSIC. The FIO program is centered on the “all-crimes” aspect of the NYSIC, so it 
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would not directly transfer to the needs of the fire service. It does, however, demonstrate 
a willingness for the NYSIC to provide training to local responders to improve 
information sharing. Elements of the FIO program structure and training will also prove 
useful for developing the NYS TLO program. In addition, as outlined in the proposed 
NYS program in Chapter V, current FIOs will be designated as mentors for the new 
TLOs. 
The second key NYSP counterterrorism (CT) effort is the coordination of the 
NYS CTZ. In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the NYS Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS), a predecessor to DHSES, led a coordinated effort among New 
York law enforcement agencies to address terrorism. The New York State Executive Law 
Enforcement Committee on Counter Terrorism divided New York State into 16 separate 
areas to encourage regionalization and cooperation among state and local law 
enforcement agencies. “These 16 Counter Terrorism Zones were created by the Office of 
Homeland Security in conjunction with the New York State Police, the New York State 
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the New York State Sheriff’s Association.”96 In 
2010, the Fire and EMS Coordinator facilitated a movement to increase fire service 
involvement in the CTZ system. In January 2011, CTZ 6 held a meeting that included fire 
service representatives. The meeting was designed to evaluate the value of fire service 
participation in the CTZ program and, if warranted, recommend a template to expand the 
concept to other CTZs. While the “experiment” has been met with positive feedback from 
CTZ 6 members, the expansion into other CTZs has been very limited. The initiation of 
the TLO program will act as a catalyst to continue the integration of the fire service into 
the CTZ system.  
Each of the aforementioned NYS agencies works with corresponding or 
complementary federal agencies that help support their intelligence mission. While the 
list is extensive, two federal departments and one office bear mention in relation to fire 
service intelligence: The U.S. DHS, The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 
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The U.S. DHS was formed in November 2002 with the passage of the Homeland 
Security Act. The mission of the cabinet-level department is to, “ensure a homeland that 
is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”97  
As mentioned in an earlier section, the FSIE is an initiative to incorporate the fire 
service in the IC. Several agencies within DHS are involved. “The FSIE represents a 
collaborative initiative of several U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) entities–
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office (I&A/SLPO), 
and the U.S. Fire Administration, with support from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, National Preparedness Directorate.”98 While the FSIE concept plan is sound, the 
initiative stalled in 2010. In 2012, however, efforts have been made to rejuvenate the 
FSIE. As stated by one of the founding FSIE members, “Through the passage of time and 
a maturing of the fusion process, which was in its infancy during the operation of the 
FSIE, the opportunity now exists for a renewed commitment from I&A and the fire 
service to revisit the FSIE.”99 A NYS TLO program will provide individuals to assist in 
this renewed FSIE program. 
The second DHS agency to be covered by this thesis is the United States Fire 
Administration (USFA), which was established in 1974 with a litany of responsibilities. 
Germane to this thesis are two USFA initiatives. First, the USFA founded the United 
States Fire Academy (USFA) whose mission is to, “advance the professional 
development of fire service personnel.”100 The USFA is currently in the early 
development stage of a fire intelligence curriculum. Education and professional 
development will be an invaluable part of the fire service evolution into the intelligence 
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community. Once the new curriculum is on-line, it will be a valuable source for TLO 
continuing education. 
The USFA-housed Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) has a three-part mission: 
 “Collect critical infrastructure protection and resilience 
information having potential relevance for Emergency Services 
Sector departments and agencies. 
 Analyze all collected information to ascertain the importance and 
applicability to Emergency Services Sector organizations. 
 Synthesize and disseminate emergent and consequential 
infrastructure protection and resilience information to the leaders, 
owners, and operators of the emergency services.”101 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has always been part of the fire service 
mission. The EMR-ISAC produces INFOGRAMs and CIP Bulletins published and 
disseminated to keep the Emergency Service Sector (ESS) informed on CIP issues.102 As 
the fire service is tasked with responding to incidents involving critical infrastructure, it 
will prove to be valuable sources of intelligence for the TLO. 
The second federal department that impacts the local fire services intelligence 
capabilities is the U.S. DOJ. Specifically within the DOJ, the FBI’s national security 
mission is to, “lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the 
United States.”103  
As America’s lead federal law enforcement agency, the FBI is involved with a 
wide variety of CT initiatives. The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), a 1980 FBI 
program, has expanded greatly since 9/11. The FBI considers the JTTF to be the nation’s, 
“front line on terrorism: small cells of highly trained, locally based, passionately 
committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from 
                                                 
101 U.S. Fire Administration, “USFA CIP/EMR-ISAC Factsheet,” March 2009, 
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dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”104 JTTFs are based in 103 
cities across the United States and many, but not all, include representatives from the fire 
service. A TLO with a security clearance will be a valuable SME (hazardous materials, 
CIP, etc.) if needed for a JTTF investigation. 
The last federal entity to review is the ODNI. Created through the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the ODNI, “serves as the head of the 
Intelligence Community, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National 
Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National 
Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to 
national security.”105 
Among the several functions of the ODNI that impact the local fire service, the 
one outlined in this thesis is the ITACG. “Enacted at the direction of the President and 
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Interagency 
Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) consists of federal intelligence 
analysts, and state, local, and tribal first responders, working at the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of intelligence with our state, 
local, tribal, and private sector (STLP) partners through established mechanisms within 
DHS and FBI.”106 The mission of the NCTC is to, “Lead our nation’s effort to combat 
terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our 
partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”107 
As part of the NCTC, ITACG’s mission is to, “…facilitate the production and timely 
issuance of terrorism-related interagency products for distribution to State, Local, Tribal, 
and Private Sector (SLTP) partners.”108  
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To enable this mission, the ITACG publishes the Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders (IGFR). The 2011 IGFR is a guidebook to introduce first responders to the 
world of intelligence. It covers the basic terminology and the elements of the intelligence 
cycle.109 The IGFR will be an excellent reference and teaching tool for a NYS TLO. 
In addition to the IGFR, in July 2012, the ITACG (in conjunction with DHS and 
the FBI) introduced FIRE LINE. “The FIRE LINE is the first federally coordinated 
intelligence product written specifically for the fire, rescue and EMS community. It’s an 
unclassified/for-official-use-only counterterrorism product developed from U.S. 
Intelligence Community reporting and open-source information on potential targets, 
preattack indicators and major international and domestic events.”110 If this product 
proves to be regularly produced with timely information, it will complement CrossFIRE 
and be a very valuable tool for the NYS TLOs. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The current threats facing the fire service and the citizens it protects are complex 
and evolving. The expansion of the local fire service’s role in New York State in the 
intelligence enterprise is a key component of meeting the demands of these current and 
emerging threats. Research shows that the fire service has an interest in expanding its 
involvement, but is not well connected to the current tools available. New York State and 
the federal government have intelligence agencies tasked with connecting to the local fire 
service, but those relationships are often sporadic and underdeveloped. In addition, with 
competing priorities and shrinking budgets, the fire service is losing ground on many 
fronts since the initial post-9/11 surges. 
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As introduced in this chapter, a TLO program provides a well-trained cadre of fire 
service personnel to refocus NYS efforts to improve the fire service intelligence 
enterprise. Chapter IV delivers a detailed program analysis of three nationally recognized 
TLO programs and proposes the implementation of a locally initiate statewide TLO 
program for New York State. 
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IV EVALUATING SOLUTIONS 
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 
- Benjamin Franklin 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter outlines the need to progress NYS local fire service 
involvement in the intelligence enterprise. This thesis asserts that commencing a locally 
initiated, statewide TLO program will provide the necessary structure and means. New 
York State is in the envious position of learning by the experience of other jurisdictions. 
Three nationally recognized TLO programs (Arizona, Colorado and Los Angeles) are 
presented as possible models for a NYS system. A brief synopsis of each precedes a 
formal program analysis. Each TLO program is examined via four evaluation factors: 
effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility, and adaptability. Each of the four 
factors is divided into five criteria. Each criterion is rated low, medium or high based on 
the developed matrix. The results are scored, weighted and used to rank the three 
programs. A detailed explanation for each factor and criteria is provided as part of the 
program analysis. 
B.  OVERVIEW OF TLO PROGRAMS TO BE EVALUATED  
The three programs chosen for evaluations spawned from the TAC TLO initiative. 
Each program, however, adapted to meet the needs of the agencies and communities it 
strives to protect. Several national and international programs were researched as 
potential candidates for inclusion in this thesis. The three selected programs were chosen 
for evaluation for two key reasons.  
First, all three systems are well established (five years or longer). Despite the later 




(crawl–walk–run), looking to an established model incorporates the benefits of longevity. 
Each of these programs have evolved since inception and successfully proven its worth 
when evaluated by its sponsor agencies. 
Second, programs were chosen based on availability of research materials. Fusion 
centers and TLO programs are an example of a government paradox. As public agencies 
and programs, accountability is crucial. With this comes certain public knowledge related 
to functions performed. Concurrently, each deals with matters related to active criminal 
investigations, terrorism, and sensitive information. Consequently, publicly available 
information is often limited. Information for the TLO evaluations is based on review of 
FOUO documents and participant observer-based conversations with program leadership.  
1. Arizona: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) 
Founded in 2004, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) 
operates the Terrorism Liaison Unit (TLU) that houses the Arizona TLO program. “The 
mission of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is to protect the citizens 
and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing and coordinating counter terrorism 
intelligence and other investigative support efforts among local, state and federal law 
enforcement agencies.”111  
The ACTIC is a progression of an effort first began in the City of Phoenix in 
2003. The multi-discipline Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) was formed in October of 
that year with the goal of, “Being an all-hazards approach to impacting major incidents 
including terrorist events.” During the remainder of 2003, the first TLOs from Phoenix 
police, fire and health were trained in awareness and response.112 
The focus of this thesis’ evaluation is the Phoenix-Maricopa County Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (PUASI) TLO program.113 This program is a descendant of the HDB 
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program started just the year before. For the purpose of this analysis, it is referred to as 
the ACTIC TLO. To date, the ACTIC TLO program has trained approximately 809 
personnel. 
2. Colorado: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) 
Founded in 2005, the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) is a “multi 
agency fusion center created to help prevent terrorism incidents in Colorado.” Its mission 
is “To link all stakeholders in Colorado, from local and federal law enforcement officers, 
to bankers and school teachers. It emphasizes detection, prevention, and information-
driven response to protect the citizens and critical infrastructure of Colorado.” The CIAC 
is a centralized effort, designed to, “enhance interagency cooperation and expedite 
information flow.”114 
The CIAC TLO program began in 2007. “The TLO is an identified person within 
a law enforcement agency, fire service, or public safety sector who is responsible for 
coordinating terrorist and other criminal intelligence information between the CIAC and 
their agency.” Specific to information sharing, the CIAC TLO program is, “A critical 
pathway for formalizing procedures and processes for more efficient information sharing 
exchange between Fusion Centers, Federal and State agencies and local communities.”115 
To date, the CIAC TLO program has approximately 600-trained personnel. 
3. Los Angeles: Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC) 
Founded in 2006,116 the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) is, “a 
collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety 
agencies to integrate criminal and terrorism threat intelligence and provide intake, 
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analysis, fusion, synthesis, and dissemination of that information.” The JRIC operates 
within the seven counties of FBI’s Los Angeles field office jurisdiction.117  
The JRIC is another excellent example of an evolutionary process. In 1996, the 
Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) was established to fill a void in 
information about terrorism. “Local law enforcement and public safety agencies—fire 
service, medical, and public health agencies—all play roles in anticipating, pre-planning 
for, preventing and responding to potential terrorist attacks.”118 Many aspects of the JRIC 
evolved from the TEW. After the 2006 creation of the JRIC, the two are now co-located 
and are working to reduce duplication of efforts. 
The JRIC TLO program began with the JRIC’s foundation. In his 2006 testimony 
to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Los Angeles 
County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca stated, “[The TLO] program seeks to create a network of 
trusted agents within each law enforcement, fire and health agency in Los Angeles 
County that provides the vehicle to exchange valuable information to and from the 
JRIC.” Sheriff Baca continued to state, “This level of intelligence-based connectivity 
between field personnel is unprecedented and has enhanced the level of situational 
awareness in the region.”119 
Due to the size and complexity of the JRIC TLO program, the Los Angeles City 
Fire (LAFD) is the JRIC TLO participating agency of focus for this thesis. As the largest 
fire service JRIC participant, LAFD has the most extensive and well-documented 
programs available for evaluation. To date, the JRIC TLO program has approximately 
185-trained personnel. 
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C.  TLO EVALUATION MATRIX 
Although the three TLO programs share a common ancestry, each has unique 
characteristics that were developed to meet the needs of the individual jurisdictions it 
serves. The approach of this thesis is to weigh the shortcomings and benefits of each 
program systematically based on a set of evaluation factors. The factors were chosen to 
reflect the viability of implementing a TLO program in New York State that advances the 
needs of the local fire service. The factors are weighted to reflect their level of 
importance in reaching this end goal. 
Four factors are used to evaluate the alternative TLO programs: effectiveness 
(E1), efficiency (E2), political and legal feasibility (PL), and adaptability (AD). Each of 
the four factors is comprised of five criteria. Twenty criteria are used to evaluate the three 
TLO programs. Each criterion is rated low, medium or high based on the developed 








Table 2.   Point Values 
Once a factor’s criteria for all three programs are given a rating (and 
corresponding numeric), the numerical values for each individual program are summed 
(receiving a score between 5 and 15). This process is repeated for each factor (E1, E2, PL 
and AD). The summed values of each factor are then placed in the following formula to 
determine the overall rating (OR) for each individual TLO program. Each factor is 
weighted to indicate the level of influence it has on the overall ranking. Each of the four 
weights is assigned a fractional value that adds up to 1. Based on this overall rating, the 
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programs are ranked (first, second and third) to indicate which program would be the best 
model for a NYS TLO initiative.  
The OR formula is applied to each of the three TLO programs.  
 
Overall Rating (OR)=.35(E1)+.30(E2)+.25(PL)+.10(AD) 
 
The subsequent descriptions provide a detailed overview of each of the four 
factors (E1, E2, PL and AD) and their corresponding criteria. They are presented in the 
order in which they are weighted (highest to lowest). 
1. Effectiveness (E1) 
The first factor is Effectiveness (E1) that measures how well the program meets 
the goal of increasing the information-sharing environment for the local fire service in 
New York State. Effectiveness is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 3 and 
given the highest weight of .35. 
 
Description of Standards for Rating of TLO  
Effectiveness (E1) 
Evaluation Criteria Low Medium High 
Fusion Center Based 
Little to no 
interaction with 
State or local 
fusion center 
Primary interaction with 
Intelligence Community 
is through Fusion Center
Interact with 































Some outreach to 





response partners  
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Description of Standards for Rating of TLO  
Effectiveness (E1) 






limited or untimely 
Information 
Sharing robust and 
timely 
Table 3.   Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Effectiveness (E1) 
The first E1 criterion queries if the TLO program is fusion center-based. Since 
one of the needs identified in Chapter III is the local fire service’s necessity to have a 
closer connection to state-based intelligence networks, a fusion-based system is an 
effective way to facilitate that requirement.  
The second E1 criterion queries if the program is multi-disciplinary. While being 
multi-disciplinary was the vision of the original TLO program, not all jurisdictions have 
embraced this approach. Some programs choose to remain law enforcement-centric. This 
thesis asserts that a multi-disciplinary approach leads to a stronger and more effective 
program. Specific to the parameters of this inquiry, this criterion evaluates whether the 
fire service is an active partner. In addition to being a force multiplier in sheer numbers, 
the fire service brings subject matter expertise (CIP, Hazmat, etc.) to a TLO program that 
is unique. For the fire service in New York State to evolve in the intelligence enterprise, 
the best NYS TLO model is based on a program that recognizes and embraces this 
assertion.  
The third E1 criterion queries if the program is multi-jurisdictional. Since this 
thesis is proposing a statewide program, one that has proven successful beyond a single 
jurisdiction will provide a better model. 
The fourth E1 criterion queries if the program has an outreach component. This 
criterion measures outreach and interaction with both the community and response 
partners. If a TLO program simply provides an information flow to and from the fusion 
center, notable benefits do happen. However, if outreach to the community and response 
partners occurred (law enforcement, public heath, etc.), the benefits would increase. 
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The final E1 criterion queries if the program has robust and timely information 
sharing. If information sharing is sporadic or untimely between the TLOs and the fusion 
center and/or its local partners, then the usefulness of the program is greatly diminished. 
2. Efficiency (E2) 
The second factor is Efficiency (E2) that measures the cost of the program and the 
lasting benefits if the current funding was removed. It proved challenging to extrapolate 
the cost of many of the criteria because of limited data and multiple funding streams. Due 
to the importance of cost analysis, however, the criteria were developed and best 
estimates used. Efficiency is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 4 and given 
the weight of .30.  
 
Description of Standards for Rating of TLO  
Efficiency (E2) 
Evaluation Criteria Low Medium High 
Initial Training Cost High Cost per TLO 
Moderate Cost 
per TLO 
Low Cost per 
TLO 



























































Table 4.   Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Efficiency (E2) 
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The first E2 criterion examines the cost of initial TLO training. The cost was 
evaluated from the perspective of the agency sponsoring a participant. If all costs are 
born by the locals, that program is rated low. If the fusion center or state homeland 
security agency covers the cost of the training, for example, a medium rating is given. If 
backfill and overtime costs for paid personnel are covered in addition to the cost of the 
training, it is given a high rating.  
The second E2 criterion examines the cost of continuing TLO education. 
Continuing education is an important and necessary feature of any program. Keeping 
costs low to the sponsoring agency will increase program buy-in. A low rating is for 
continuing education only available off-site (out of jurisdiction). A medium rating is for 
continuing education available on-site only. A high rating is given to programs that 
incorporate distance learning (self-paced) for a portion of the continuing education 
requirements. 
The third E2 criterion examines the cost of technology support. In today’s world, 
a great deal of TLO related information is transmitted and accessed electronically. The 
associated costs (hardware and software) impact the overall cost of the program.  
The fourth E2 criterion examines the cost of administering the TLO program. 
This cost relates to the number of paid staff assigned to manage the program. While the 
size of the program (number of TLOs and coverage area) will impact this number, it is an 
important consideration for New York State. A high cost equates to a low score, and 
conversely, a low cost is given a high score. 
The final E2 criterion estimates the sustainability of the program benefits if the 
current external funding streams were reduced or eliminated. Some TLO programs, like 
many homeland security initiatives, are partially to fully grant funded. This criterion aims 
to evaluate the relationship between program benefits and external funding. 
3. Political and Legal Feasibility (PL)  
The third factor is Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) that measures five buy-in 
benchmarks from key stakeholders. While Chapter V goes into greater depth regarding 
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stakeholder issues to be considered with program implementation, these criteria are 
intended to impact the initial evaluation. PL is measured based on the criteria outlined in 
Table 5 and given the weight of .25. 
 
Description of Standards for Rating of TLO 
Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) 
Evaluation Criteria Low Medium High 
Legal Contract 


















All Hazards Approach 
Program has all 
crime approach 
only 
Program has all 
crimes focus with 
all hazards 
elements 
Program is all 
hazards based 
Fire Service Mission Creep 
Fire service 
based TLO 







































to include career 
and volunteer 
members 
Table 5.   Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Political and Legal Feasibility 
(PL) 
The first PL criterion examines the legal relationship between a TLO and the 
sponsoring program agency. Due to the sensitive nature of intelligence, the sponsoring 
agency must have a mechanism to hold a TLO accountable if information is mishandled 
or other program rules and regulations are not followed. If a program only involves 
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sworn uniformed members, then a TLO could be disciplined using employment rules. If a 
TLO is a member of a volunteer organization, for example, such rules may not exist. 
The second PL criterion evaluates the degree to which the TLO program is all-
crimes versus all-hazards based. An all-hazards approach to homeland security “is a 
concerted national effort to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, protect against man-
made and natural hazards, and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.”120 
An all-crimes based program is less desirable to fire service organizations than one that 
looks at a broader hazard spectrum.  
The third PL criterion evaluates the level of fire service mission creep. 
Implementing a TLO program could meet with resistance from opponents who think fire 
service involvement with the intelligence enterprise is beyond its mission scope. Chapter 
III builds the case that the fire service must change to meet the evolving threats. In 
recognition of the crawl-walk-run approach, however, this thesis asserts that a TLO 
program that focuses on more traditional fire service mission elements will garner more 
support from a broader foundation. Consequently, the three existing TLO programs are 
rated based on how much they drift from traditional missions. 
The fourth PL criterion evaluates the privacy component. One of the potential 
opponents mentioned above are privacy advocates. This author concurs that maintaining 
an individual’s privacy rights is an essential element of any TLO program. This criterion 
rates the degree to which each program incorporates a privacy element into its program. 
The final PL criterion examines if the program incorporates volunteers. NYS’ fire 
service is approximately 84% volunteer.121 Rural areas of the state have limited career 
fire service coverage. Consequently, if NYS’s TLO program is going to meet the needs of 
the fire service across the state, inclusion of volunteer TLOs must be considered. A TLO 
program inclusive of the volunteer firefighters will increase the number of trained 
personnel better equipped to “See Something, Say Something” within their communities. 
                                                 
120 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” Homeland 
Security Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1 
121 New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, “Fire 
Protection in New York State,” (n.d.), http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Fire_Protection_in_NYS.pdf. 
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Their newfound expertise could result in the acquisition of preemptive intelligence about 
potential terrorists, which could save lives. 
4. Adaptability (AD) 
The final factor is Adaptability (AD) that measures criteria focused on a TLO 
program’s ability to be initiated in another area of the country. Since all three programs 
are located in other regions of the country, it is essential to evaluate whether a program 
can be adapted in NYS. AD is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 6 and 
given the weight of .10. 
 
Description of Standards for Rating of TLO 
Adaptability (AD) 
Evaluation Criteria Low Medium High 
NIMS Based 





Entire program is 
NIMS based 
Agency Specific Program 
Few program 
elements would 




















enactment in new 
jurisdiction 
Program would 
require limited or 
no legislative 




be scaled to work 




program can be 
scaled to work in 
smaller or larger 
jurisdictions 
Entire program 
can be scaled to 




None of the 
training program 
can be tiered to 
meet the needs of 
the participating 
local jurisdiction 
Elements of the 
training program 
can be tiered to 




program can be 
tiered to meet the 
needs of the 
participating local 
jurisdiction 
Table 6.   Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Adaptability (AD) 
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The first AD criterion rates if the program is based on the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), which was developed by the United States Secretary of 
Homeland Security at the direction of the President of the United States, per HSPD-5. 
The NIMS integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a 
comprehensive national framework for incident management. The NIMS enables 
responders at all levels to work together to manage effectively, “domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size or complexity.”122 
In addition to ensuring a TLO program will work effectively with the national 
incident management framework, NIMS compliance is required to be eligible for federal 
grant funds.123 While recommendations for funding streams have yet to be put forth, it is 
likely some element of a TLO program would be impacted by federally initiated grant 
funding. Each TLO program is rated on its level of NIMS compliance. 
The second AD criterion evaluates whether a program is agency specific. As 
previously mentioned, programs were chosen for evaluation based on a variety of factors. 
Since this thesis advocates for a statewide program in New York State, existing systems 
that have a proven record of statewide implementation are rated higher. This is not to say 
other programs would not translate to a larger jurisdiction, but that potential would be 
captured in the other criterion.  
The third AD criterion evaluates legislative requirements. While state law will 
vary greatly, the level of legislative process a program has undergone is a potential 
indication of a NYS implementation challenge. The higher the level of legislation 
involvement required, the lower the rating. 
The fourth AD criterion is scalability. While discussed further in Chapter V, a 
proposed NYS TLO program entails the crawl-walk-run approach that is applicable to 
both program size and function. If an evaluated program cannot be scaled to meet the 
needs of New York State, it is rated low. If it is very scalable, it is rated high. 
                                                 
122 National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Homeland 
Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2004), iii. 
123 Ibid., ix. 
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The final AD criterion evaluates if the TLO program has tiered training. While 
this thesis asserts that all TLOs should be trained to a predetermined basic level, 
additional training should be available to meet the individual needs of the participating 
agency. A program that takes this approach across all elements is rated higher than one 
that does not.  
D.  TLO PROGRAM EVALUATION 
Based on the factors detailed in the section above, each of the three nationally 
recognized TLO programs is evaluated below. The final results are used to determine 
which of the three programs ranks the highest based on NYS specific criteria. 
1. Effectiveness (E1) 














ACTIC Medium High High High High 
CIAC Medium High High High High 
JRIC Medium High Medium High High 
Table 7.   Rating of Effectiveness (E1) Criteria 
a. E1 Analysis 
All three programs scored well in effectiveness (E1). All programs 
incorporate multi-disciplines and have outreach programs to the community. The JRIC 
scored slightly lower with the multi-jurisdictional category because the other two 
programs are statewide and the JRIC is regional.124 All three are fusion center based 
programs and TLOs are encouraged to funnel all interactions with outside intelligence 
                                                 
124 NOTE: California has three fusion centers to cover the state. 
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community agencies through their centers. Most importantly, each is able to increase 
information sharing between the local fire service and the intelligence community. 
Table 8 shows the summation of the E1 scores and provides an E1 factor 
ranking. 
 
E1 Quantitative Evaluation 
TLO Program Effectiveness (E1) Evaluation (E1) Rank 
ACTIC E1=2+3+3+3+3 E1=14 1 
CIAC E1=2+3+3+3+3 E1=14 1 
JRIC E1=2+3+2+3+3 E1=13 3 
Table 8.   E1 Quantitative Evaluation 
2. Efficiency (E2) 














ACTIC High High Low Medium Medium 
CIAC Medium High High Medium High 
JRIC Medium High High Medium Medium 
Table 9.    Rating of Effectiveness (E2) Criteria 
a. E2 Analysis 
The efficiency (E2) factor showed both core commonalities and some 
stark differences in the programs. One of the major differences is the level of services 
provided by the TLOs. In the ACTIC, the TLOs are much more involved in analysis 
functions. They are trained to use a wide variety of intelligence analytical tools (in the 
fusion center and the field). Many are law enforcement databases that require additional 
training and technology support. With these capabilities comes an increase in cost. Since 
 54
the ACTIC program is completely grant funded, however, for this analysis, it scored high 
in initial training cost (no cost to the sponsoring agency). The CIAC and JRIC programs 
have non-grant funding sources, which means higher initial costs to sponsoring agencies 
that also leads to programs with more sustainability. 
All three programs have distance-learning components to their continuing 
education that helps manage costs. The need to maintain the technology tools translates to 
a low score for the ACTIC. All three programs require administrative support from the 
fusion centers, which translates to increased personnel costs and a medium rating. 
Table 10 shows the summation of the E2 scores and provides an E2 factor 
ranking. 
 
Efficiency (E2) Quantitative Evaluation 
TLO Program Efficiency (E2) Evaluation (E2) Rank 
ACTIC E2=3+3+1+2+2 E2=11 3 
CIAC E2=2+3+3+2+3 E2=13 1 
JRIC E2=2+3+3+2+2 E2=12 2 
Table 10.   Efficiency (E2) Quantitative Evaluation 
3. Political and Legal Feasibility (PL)  















ACTIC High High Medium High Low 
CIAC High High Medium High High 
JRIC High High Medium High High 
Table 11.   Rating of Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Criteria 
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a. PL Analysis 
The PL evaluation factor shows similarities between the programs, but 
also illustrates important differences. All three programs are housed in fusion centers that 
embrace an all-hazards approach. In addition, each has well-defined privacy policies 
based on 28 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 23 privacy standards.125,126  
A major difference between the programs is TLO membership. The 
ACTIC is unique in that it only allows sworn uniformed personnel (law enforcement, fire 
or military) to be TLOs. It maintains its legal contract through employment agreements. 
The other two programs allow non-sworn personnel to participate. It maintains a legal 
contract through a signed non-disclosure agreement (NDA). The NDAs allow criminal 
prosecution if the terms of the contracts are broken. 
Regarding mission creep, all three scored medium because they each 
allow fire service TLOs to support non-traditional fire services missions, which is typical 
of seasoned programs.  
Table 12 shows the summation of the PL scores and provides a PL factor 
ranking. 
 
Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Quantitative Evaluation 
TLO Program Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) 
Evaluation 
(PL) Rank 
ACTIC PL=3+3+2+3+1 PL=12 3 
CIAC PL=3+3+2+3+3 PL=14 1 
JRIC PL=3+3+2+3+3 PL=14 1 
Table 12.   Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Quantitative Evaluation 
                                                 
125 NOTE: From the ACTIC website: “28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 is a guideline 
for law enforcement agencies that operate federally funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence 
systems. 28CFR provides the foundation for gathering, analyzing, disseminating and storing intelligence 
information.” 
126 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), “Definitions,” (n.d.), 
http://www.azactic.gov/About/Definitions/. 
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4. Adaptability (AD) 














ACTIC High High High High Medium 
CIAC High High High High Medium 
JRIC High Medium High High High 
Table 13.   Rating of Adaptability (AD) Criteria 
a. AD Analysis 
All three programs are NIMS based and did not require special legislation 
to be created. As programs established through their fusion centers, each is bound by the 
rules and regulations of the center. Each overall program is scalable, but the JRIC has a 
more tiered training structure (especially for entry-level training). The JRIC TLO 
program materials, however, are more agency-specific. This specificity slightly reduces 
its adaptability. 
Table 14 shows the summation of the AD scores and provides an AD 
factor ranking. 
 
Adaptability (AD) Quantitative Evaluation 
TLO Program Adaptability (AD) Evaluation (AD) Rank 
ACTIC AD=3+3+3+3+2 AD=14 1 
CIAC AD=3+3+3+3+2 AD=14 1 
JRIC AD=3+2+3+3+3 AD=14 1 
Table 14.   Adaptability (AD) Quantitative Evaluation 
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5. Overall Rating (OR) 
The following three tables (Tables 15–17) plug in the values from each of the four 
evaluation factors into the weighted formula to determine the OR for each of the three 
TLO programs. 
 
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(ACTIC) TLO 




Table 15.   Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) TLO 






Table 16.   Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) TLO 






Table 17.   Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC) TLO 
Table 18 reports and ranks the three TLO programs Overall Rating (OR). 
TLO Program TLO Overall Rating (OR) Rank 
ACTIC OA=12.6 3 
CIAC OA=13.7 1 
JRIC OA=13.05 2 
Table 18.   Three TLO Programs Overall Rating (OR) 
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Based on the policy options analysis performed, the CIAC TLO program is the 
best model for New York State to use to develop its own TLO program. The CIAC TLO 
is a fusion-center based, statewide program that has increased information sharing 
between the fire service and the intelligence community. “The TLO program creates an 
expansive statewide network of personnel by combining local fire and law enforcement 
resources linked to federal and state assets to provide an effective and viable two-way 
flow of information.”127 The next chapter outlines specific elements of CIAC TLO duties 
and training as part of the recommended NYS program. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
While Chapter III established the need to evolve the NYS local fire service’s 
involvement in the intelligence enterprise, Chapter IV evaluated solutions. Four factors, 
each containing five criteria, were used to evaluate three nationally recognized TLO 
programs to determine which one provides the best model for New York State. While all 
three programs share a common ancestry, the CIAC TLO program proves to be the best 
model for New York State. 
Based on the program option analysis results, Chapter V outlines a detailed 
recommendation for a NYS TLO program. The chapter also provides a comprehensive 
analysis of implementation considerations and concludes with thoughts on ways to 
continue to evolve the fire service intelligence enterprise.  
                                                 
127 Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook (Lakewood, CO: Colorado Information Analysis Center 
(CIAC), 2011), 3. 
 59
V. RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
CONCLUSION 
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The 
occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. 
As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. 
- Abraham Lincoln 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This chapter recommends evolving the local NYS fire service involvement in the 
intelligence enterprise through the development of a NYS TLO program based on the 
CIAC TLO program. A program overview is provided and a Fiscal Year One (FY1) 
budget is projected. This chapter examines the strategy considerations for implementing a 
fire service-inclusive TLO program in New York State, identifies stakeholders 
(proponents and opponents), potential concerns and presents an implementation 
methodology for success. The conclusion presents final thoughts on the future of the local 
NYS fire service intelligence enterprise. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Program Overview 
Based on the CIAC TLO model, the locally initiated NYS TLO program is 
statewide and multi-discipline. The program is designed to meet the needs of the local 
fire service, but is inclusive of other disciplines (law enforcement, public health, etc.). 
The multi-discipline approach to the program breaks down communication barriers on 
the local level and increases stakeholder support as it works to increase lawful 
information sharing between all governmental levels. Since all disasters (natural or 
manmade) begin and end on the local level, one of the greatest benefits of the NYS TLO 
program will be a more cohesive working relationship between local responders. 
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As a fusion center-centric program, the TLO program will be based out of the 
NYSIC. The NYSIC will provide a consistent platform for information flow to and from 
the TLOs. The NYSIC will need to develop specific TLO protocols for dissemination and 
reporting activities. The TLO program will be under the direction of NYSIC personnel 
who are in the DHSES chain of command.  
The TLO will be a direct point of contact for the NYSIC at the local level and will 
serve as a point of contact and a reference for the region. Based on the CIAC model, the 
NYS TLO daily and weekly operational duties will include the following.  
 Collect and report relevant field intelligence from the local area to the 
NYSIC  
 Assist with terrorism awareness training  
 Disseminate information to field personnel during roll call or team 
meetings 
 Disseminate information to the field units  
 Provide intelligence briefings to agency executive staff  
 Provide intelligence briefings to regional representatives128  
Any information collected and reported to the NYSIC by fire service personnel 
will be obtained in the course of their regularly assigned duties.  
Based on the crawl-walk-run approach, initial fire service TLO participants will 
not operate at the classified level per United States Presidential Executive Order 13526 
(Classified National Security Information).129 In Fiscal Year Two (FY2), select fire 
service TLOs will be vetted to the secret level to expand operational capacity. A vetted 
fire service TLO, for example, could provide valuable SMEs for a JTTF investigation. 
(Hazmat, CIP, etc.) 
A multi-discipline working group is recommended to develop a detailed 
implementation plan based on the TLO program model outlined above. The details of the 
group are discussed in the implementation section.  
                                                 
128 Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook, 4. 
129 E.O. 13526 of 12/29/10, 75 FR 1013. 
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2. Participants 
For the initial phase, TLO participants will be members of law enforcement or the 
fire service (career or volunteer).130 After the program is established, it will be branched 
out to include more disciplines (public health, etc.). Participants must be endorsed by 
their agency head, undergo a criminal background check, sign a non-disclosure 
agreement and complete the required initial training. Based on DHS/DOJ 
recommendations, attributes of a desirable candidate include the following. 
 “Possessing a wide network of contacts in their agency 
 Interest in fulfilling the role 
 Respect of peers and supervisors 
 Record of being trustworthy 
 Good judgment 
 Responsiveness 
 A subject-matter expert (SME) on a needed topic 
 A desire to make a long-term commitment to the program 
 Available time and support from the supervisor 
 Ability to pass security clearance, if required 
 Understanding of the [TLO] roles and responsibilities 
 Strong interpersonal communication skills”131 
The TLO is the information conduit between the IC and this individual’s 
organization and needs to be connected to the respective organization and community to 
possess the networks to assess and act upon emerging threats. The TLO requires the trust 
and respect of peers and supervisors to be given information to pass onto the NYSIC. The 
same trust and respect is necessary to receive intelligence from the NYSIC and the good 
judgment to know to whom to share that information with and what actions to consider. 
The information sharing and the training responsibilities will demand strong 
                                                 
130 NOTE: A volunteer firefighter TLO’s vocation may add additional value to program via added 
skill sets. 
131 Establishing a Fusion Liaison Officer Program: Development and Implementation Considerations, 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2010), 27. 
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communication skills. The program will benefit by initially recruiting participants who 
will be committed and enthusiastic advocates the TLO concept. 
3. Program Training 
Each TLO participant will receive 24 hours of initial training. Based on the CIAC 
model, the curriculum includes the following.  
 Domestic and international terrorism trends specific to New York  
 Intelligence cycle  
 CFR 28 compliance  
 Threat vulnerabilities  
 Vulnerability assessments  
 Critical infrastructure protection 
 Situational recognition  
 TLO and responder safety 
 Information analysis and dissemination  
 Incident response to terrorist bombings  
 Prevention and response to suicide bombing incidents  
 Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)132,133  
 NYSIC operations134  
The training should be delivered by SMEs who represent the various disciplines 
that incorporate the program. 
4. Pilot Project 
Based on the crawl-walk-run approach, this thesis recommends the TLO program 
be initiated as a pilot program (crawl). While the end goal is to have TLO participants in 
                                                 
132 NOTE: “The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a national secure and trusted 
web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 
private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission.”  
133 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” (n.d.), 
http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network. 
134 Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook, 4. 
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all areas of New York State (walk), a pilot project will allow the program to be developed 
and evaluated on a manageable scale. Based on efforts already underway in CTZ-6 to be 
more inclusive of the fire service, it is recommended to be the area to undertake the pilot 
program that will incorporate seven (Broome, Chenango, Cortland, Delaware, Otsego, 
Tioga and Tompkins) of NYS’s 62 counties. The working group will determine future 
initiative (run). Expanding the TLO analysis capabilities and NYSIC role are examples of 
future initiatives.  
5. Projected FY1 Budget 
Table 19 is a projected FY1 Budget for a TLO pilot project. 
 
NYS TLO Projected Budget (FY1)135 
Item Cost 
Initial Training $5,000 




Projected FY1 Budget (Total) $15,000
Table 19.   NYS TLO Projected Budget (FY1) 
This thesis recommends that existing NYSIC grant funds for the Field 
Intelligence Officer (FIO) program and other identified homeland security initiatives be 
used to support the pilot project. For FY1, personnel cost (salary, travel, etc.) for TLO 
candidate training will be covered by the participating agency. As a locally initiated 
program, it is important for local governments to provide a commitment to the TLO 
concept with local funds. 
As presented, the FY1 pilot program has minimal program costs. As the program 
develops, consideration will be given to additional program financial elements 
(awareness training, travel, computer requirements, etc.). A program budget for FY2 will 
                                                 
135 NOTE: It is possible that existing NYSIC personnel and budget lines can absorb Technology and 
Administrative costs. 
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be created during the pilot for inclusion in the DHSES budget. In addition, grant funding 
will be sought to further develop the TLO programs’ size and scope. Both funding 
avenues will address training cost and operational costs. 
C.  IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
No new program is created in a vacuum. The recommended NYS TLO program 
will be developed within an existing complex environment. Many stakeholders are 
involved and their input to the TLO program will shape the final TLO structure and 
implementation. This thesis describes the stakeholders, their roles and recommends 
strategies for successful implementation.  
1. Stakeholders 
The first step is to identify the stakeholders who will impact the TLO program. 
The stakeholders will be divided into four categories. The primary stakeholder for the 
purpose of this analysis is the fire service. Secondary stakeholders (for the analysis and 
not a reflection on importance) are law enforcement (LE), IC and the public. Each group 
will be described and analyzed to recognize prevalent attitudes and issues related to the 
proposed TLO program. 
a. Primary 
Several organizations represent the fire service in NYS. The principal is 
the state fire agency, the New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC). 
In addition, three membership organizations best reflect the overall diversity of the fire 
service: the New York State Association of Fire Chiefs (NYSAFC), the New York State 
Professional Fire Fighters Association (NYSPFFA), and the Firemen’s Association of the 
State of New York (FASNY). 
Introduced in Chapter III, the OFPC is a department within the NYS 
DHSES. Per its mission statement, “The New York State Office of Fire Prevention and 
Control strives to be the nationally recognized leader in fire services, delivering the 
highest quality, state of the art, and most comprehensive training, response, and technical 
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assistance programs and services to emergency responders, local entities, and the citizens 
of New York State.”136  
The NYSAFC has the widest representation of fire service members. 
According to its website, “Any member of an emergency service organization or a 
business that serves the emergency service field can become a member of this 
Association.”137 Within the overall organization, committees exist that represent the 
interests of the career and volunteer members. To date, no separate committee addresses 
the issue of the fire service’s involvement in the intelligence enterprise. Executive 
Director Thomas L. LaBelle states, “The Association has considered and is interested in 
the issue, but has made limited progress to date.”138 
The NYSPFFA contains approximately 16,500 (5,500 excluding the Fire 
Department of New York) members and represents union fire fighters across New York 
State. While the primary function of the NYSPFFA is to support worker’s rights and 
benefits, the union will often engage in political efforts to support fire service-related 
initiatives. For example, the NYSPFFA is an affiliate of the International Fire Fighters 
Association (IAFF), which represents career firefighters across the United States and 
Canada. In 2007, the IAFF met with congressional leaders and endorsed the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation and the 9/11 Security Bill. Among several items, the bill 
provided funding to increase information sharing between federal, state and local 
officials. “The time is now to act on this important legislation,” says [IAFF] General 
President Schaitberger. “Our members play a crucial role in terrorism response and 
Homeland Security, yet so many first responder needs remain unmet.”139  
                                                 
136 New York State, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, Office of Fire 
Prevention and Control (OFPC), “Our Mission, Our Vision,” (n.d.), http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ofpc/. 
137 Firemen’s Association of the State of New York, “Membership,” (n.d.), 
http://www.fasny.com/index.php/membership/. 
138 Thomas L. LaBelle, personal correspondence with author, June 22, 2012. 
139 International Association of Fire Fighters, “IAFF Endorses Remaining 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations,” February 28, 2007, http://www.iaff.org/07News/22807Reid.htm. 
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FASNY boasts over 40,000 members and represents volunteer fire 
fighters’ interests across New York State.140 While FASNY has no direct committee that 
reviews intelligence issues, the group is politically active and engages regularly in new 
fire service initiatives. 
As a stakeholder group, the fire service is not in total agreement as to the 
need for an increased role in the homeland security intelligence enterprise. Overall, 
however, the majority agrees that it would benefit the fire service. As stated in Chapter 
III, in a 2010 survey of fire chiefs (career and volunteer), 90% stated that receiving 
regular intelligence briefs would affect their daily operations.141 In addition, 83% want 
information that would help them with preparation activities.142 In recognition that not all 
fire service leaders buy into the concept; the USFA is in the process of developing short 
training programs to encourage executive fire officers to embrace an expanded view of 
their homeland security role. The need for intelligence and information sharing is a 
component of the program.143 
Recognizing the fire service as the major stakeholder in this initiative, one 
of the primary strategic considerations is the divide between the career and volunteer fire 
service. On average across the nation, 80% of firefighters are volunteers and they protect 
20% of the population (with the inverse for the career firefighters). New York State has 
approximately 114,000 firefighters, and 96,000 (or 84%) are volunteers.144 The 
career/volunteer fire fighter “gap” is often considered the third rail of the fire service. 
Many fire service initiatives are hampered due to intra-stakeholder friction. 
Implementation recommendations will consider this unique stakeholder characteristic. 
                                                 
140 Firemen’s Association of the State of New York, “Membership.” 
141 Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in 
the Fire and EMS Services,” 40. 
142 Ibid., 36. 
143 Keith Henke, personal communication with author, June 18, 2012. 
144 New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, “Fire 
Protection in New York State.” 
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b. Secondary 
In New York State, the law enforcement community consists of both state 
and local agencies. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on the NYSP and its 4,600 
sworn personnel. The NYSP are located throughout New York State and has primary 
responsibility to coordinate law enforcement counterterrorism efforts within the state. As 
outlined in Chapter III, one of the primary NYSP CT efforts is the coordination of the 
CTZ.  
In New York State, similar to across the nation, the fire service and law 
enforcement’s relationship is complicated. The two services are often accused of having a 
sibling rivalry. On one hand, they are often ‘brothers-in-arms’, working side by side in 
very difficult street-level operations. At other times, however, they are in competition for 
control of limited resources. While the depths of this complex relationship could be a 
stand-alone thesis topic, for this analysis, it is important to recognize that each service is 
protective of its jurisdiction and functional responsibilities. While public safety is clearly 
the purview of each, NYS LE has been the leader in the local intelligence enterprise. As 
the fire service expands its role in this area, it will be important to do so with sensitivity 
to law enforcement’s existing foundation.  
The third stakeholder is the IC. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
uniformed and civilian NYSP and DHES intelligence analysts who work out of the 
NYSIC represent the IC. As outlined in Chapter III, current interaction between the fire 
service and the IC is limited. Through the efforts of past and current fire service 
representatives assigned to the NYSIC, however, inroads have been made. The IC does 
recognize NYS’ 140,000 fire service personnel as an underutilized resource in its efforts 
to collect intelligence on potential terrorism and other illegal activities. 
The final stakeholder is the public. The fire service holds a unique public 
trust not held by other government agencies. If the public perceives that the fire service is 
“spying” on them during emergency calls, their trust may be violated. In a 2008 survey of 
32 fire chiefs, 84% felt that training fire fighters to recognize non-traditional forms of 
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terrorist threats would diminish their standing in the community.145 This public trust must 
be weighed against the potential benefits gained from an increased involvement of the 
fire service in the IC. 
In addition, in a time of shrinking budgets and competing interests, the 
public demands fiduciary responsibility. The fire service must consider the budgetary 
impact of the proposed TLO program.  
D.  IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
Implementing a fire service TLO program in New York State is not without 
challenges. In addition to choosing the CIAC TLO program model, the implementation 
process must work to address as many of the stakeholder concerns as feasible. The 
following section outlines the recommended implementation plan and then delineates 
special considerations for each stakeholder group. 
1. The Strategy 
With the CIAC TLO model as a framework, it is recommended that a working 
group be formed to fine-tune the model and develop an implementation plan specific to 
the needs of New York State. The working group should consist of the following sector 
stakeholders.146  
 Homeland Security (NYS DHSES)  
 Fire and Emergency Medical Services (NYS OFPC, NYSAFC, NYSPFFA 
and FASNY)  
 Law Enforcement (NYSP) 
 Intelligence Community (NYSIC)  
Two DHSES officials assigned to the NYSIC will co-chair the working group, the 
aforementioned OFPC Deputy Chief and an IC representative. They will report to the 
DHSES Commissioner with detailed recommendations and implementation strategies.  
                                                 
145 Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers,” 
18. 
146 NOTE: Once the TLO program begins to expand from its pilot stage, this working group can 
expand to include additional stakeholders (public health, national guard, etc.) 
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The fire service becoming a more prominent partner in the NYS IC is going to be 
a disruptive change. An inter-disciplinary group will minimize acceptance problems 
outlined above and provide buy-in through representation. Legitimate concerns expressed 
by various discipline members will have a venue for discussions. Once the system is in 
place, each discipline will have an informed member(s) to assist its individual agencies 
with implementation.  
A key component of the process will be the need for collaboration. Collaboration, 
“takes a new mind-set, one that says, ‘we can achieve more together than we can alone.’ 
A mind-set that looks across boundaries of departments, companies, and nations, and sees 
people as partners and change as opportunity, not threats.”147 
2. Fire Service 
Beyond the implementation issues listed above, the unique aspect for the fire 
service perspective will be the career/volunteer gap. The first step for success is to ensure 
the vision of the TLO program includes both career and volunteer members. A combined 
program will minimize debate as individuals and organizations self-assess to determine 
their level of buy-in.148 It is also important to assert that “combined” does not mean 
“equal” representation. It is the goal of this thesis to have TLO representation in all areas 
of NYS. Large population centers, however, may promulgate more representation. Since 
career fire personnel typically cover populous areas, it is likely that TLO representation 
will reflect this distribution.  
The second aspect to bridging the gap will be strong leadership.149 The 
chairpersons of the working-group will have to demonstrate strong leadership and 
commitment to shepherding the process. When gap issues arise, they must encourage 
                                                 
147 William J. Bratton and Zachary Tumin, Collaborate or Perish!: Reaching Across Boundaries in a 
Networked World (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 95. 
148 Michael T. Love, Improving Work Relations Between Career and Volunteer Fire and Rescue 
Members of the Montgomery County, Maryland Fire and Rescue Service (Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire 
Academy, 1999), 46. 
149 Glen Widener, Closing the Personality Gap Between Career and Volunteer Firefighters 
(Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 2002), 28. 
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open communications. Providing a transparent system for feedback and decision making 
will help facilitate this process.  
3. Law Enforcement 
As stated earlier, local homeland security intelligence activities have been the 
primary responsibility of local LE. Evolving the role of the fire service will be seen as 
disruptive to many members of LE community. In addition to the inter-disciplinary 
approach outlined above, it is essential that the fire TLO program work to merge with the 
existing LE organizational matrix. For this reason (among others outlined in the 
recommendation section of the thesis), the TLO structure will be developed to work 
within the existing CTZ. Working within the existing CTZ will help provide both 
structure and LE buy-in. Since LE already contains subject matter experts in intelligence 
(FIO), a mentor program will be part of the implementation process. Allowing LE FIOs 
to mentor fire service TLOs will help develop personal relationships that can translate to 
institutional acceptance.  
4. Intelligence Community 
As noted above, in NYS the IC is primarily composed of members of LE. Many 
of the special considerations outlined in the LE section are applicable to the IC. A 
distinctive consideration for the IC, however, is training. For the fire service to interact 
with the IC, it is essential that it understands how the IC functions. As outlined in the 
beginning of this chapter, it is crucial that the TLO training focus on how to blend 
transitional skills with IC specific systems, language, protocols and culture.  
5. Public 
It should be noted that the public is clearly identified as a stakeholder, but is not 
represented as a separate member of the working group. Public interest is a lens through 
which all public policy should be examined. As the working group develops and 
implements the TLO plan, it will consider potential public issues. 
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As the TLO program is initiated, the fire service must be careful not to violate the 
public’s trust. Consequently, it is crucial that the operating procedures and activities of 
the TLO be within the legal and ethical confines of the fire fighter’s traditional role. For 
example, if a TLO was involved with information gathering (taking a report of a 
suspicious activity from a line fire fighter), it is important that the information gathering 
be an extension of activities already being performed by fire service personnel (fire, 
rescue, medical, etc.). Under no circumstances will fire service personnel be solely tasked 
with gathering intelligence information outside their normal duties. A fire fighter 
reporting illegal activities, however, is not without precedent. In New York State, fire 
fighters routinely perform scheduled inspections of businesses to assure compliance with 
the NYS building code. Violators are issued citations or taken to court. In addition, if 
violations are found during unplanned emergency situations, fire fighters have a legal and 
ethical responsibility to take action. 
While a financial component to this proposal exists, the overall cost will be shared 
between the locals and the state. For example, local responders will absorb some of the 
cost for training. In the 2008 survey of fire chiefs, 92% stated that they would support 
intelligence gathering training from their local budgets.150 Intelligence gathering training 
is a component of the TLO program. In addition, one estimate of the cost of the 9/11 
attacks on the United States was $2 trillion.151 The cost of instituting a fire service TLO 
program pales by comparison. 
While the cost for the TLO pilot program is affordable, the working group must 
recognize that initiating a new program during the current economic climate will have its 
challenges. It is essential that the various stakeholder groups communicate the value of 
the program to their constituents. In addition, educating local leadership (mayors, 
counsels, etc.) on roles, responsibilities and need for the TLO program will be essential to 
marshaling support.  
                                                 
150 Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers,” 
20. 
151 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “How Much Did the September 11 Terrorist Attack 
Cost America?” (n.d.), http://www.iags.org/costof911.html.  
 72
The working group and the local fire service will listen to public concerns and 
thoughtfully reflect upon the issues. If modifications to the program can be made to 
address reasonable concerns, they will be considered. 
E.  PROGRAM NAME 
Prior to this point, the proposed NYS program is referred to as a Terrorism 
Liaison Officer (TLO) program, which was an intentional act to not cause confusion with 
the three TLO programs used for evaluation or the CIAC TLO chosen as the NYS model. 
As outlined in Chapter I, however, the NYS fire service is facing many threats (natural 
and manmade). To incorporate “terrorism” within the title of the NYS program may limit 
the vision of the program and provide a potential barrier for stakeholder acceptance. 
Potential titles for the proposed statewide program include: Field Intelligence Officer 
(FIO), Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO), Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO), etc. To 
encourage the all-hazard element of the proposed NYS program, Threat Liaison Officer 
is the recommended title for this new initiative. This thesis asserts that this title most 
accurately reflects the goal of the program while still encompassing the objectives of its 
ancestry. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils;  
for time is the greatest innovator.  
- Sir Francis Bacon  
Traditionally, the local fire service in New York State has not been an effective 
producer or consumer of intelligence information. Since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, homeland security organizations across the United States have developed and 
progressed to meet the demands of the varied threats. Eleven years after the 9/11 attacks, 
however, the local fire service in New York State is still struggling to evolve.  
The NYS fire service has the potential to be effective contributors, consumers and 
collaborators with regards to intelligence and information sharing. Across the state, 
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approximately 140,000 fire service personnel respond to over 1.6 million incidents 
annually.152,153 As potential contributors of intelligence, each incident is an opportunity 
for fire service personnel154 to interact with the public, and be in private homes and 
businesses. These interactions are unplanned and provide unique opportunities for fire 
service personnel to observe potential signs of terrorist and other illegal activities.155 
As potential consumers of intelligence, any of the 1.6 million annual incidents 
could prove to be a threat to fire service responders or the community at large. 
Dissemination of intelligence to the fire service will guide preparedness activities and 
increase safety during response and recovery operations.156  
As potential collaborators, the fire service brings resources and unique SME to 
the IC. The fire service can advise the IC on issues ranging from hazardous materials to 
critical infrastructure.157 The results would be beneficial to all involved. 
Government doctrine (federal and state) reinforces the local fire services’ post-
9/11 response role and creates a strong foundation for the need for an expanded 
responsibility into the area of intelligence and information sharing. Academic research 
also creates a cogent argument for an expanded fire service role, but progress has been 
slow and incremental.  
The current threats facing the fire service and the citizens it protects are complex 
and evolving. The demands for traditional fire services are changing and the threat of 
domestic and international terrorism remains. The expansion of the local fire service’s 
role in the intelligence enterprise in New York State is a key component of meeting the 
demands of these current and emerging threats. Research shows that the fire service has 
an interest in expanding its involvement, but is not well connected to the current tools 
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available. New York State and the federal government have intelligence agencies tasked 
with connecting to the local fire service, but those relationships are often sporadic and 
underdeveloped.  
As an effective and efficient way to build upon NYS’s intelligence strengths and 
overcome gaps, this thesis recommends developing and implementing a locally initiated, 
statewide fire service inclusive Threat Liaison Officer program.  
In an effort to build a program based on the lessons learned from other 
jurisdictions, three established fire service inclusive TLO programs (Arizona, Colorado 
and Los Angeles) were examined to determine good practices. Elements analyzed include 
program structure, administration, roles and responsibilities, costs, and training 
requirements. Based on four proposed NYS factors (effectiveness, efficiency, political 
and legal feasibility and adaptability), a systematic policy options analysis compared the 
three TLO programs to determine their areas of strength and weaknesses as related to the 
New York experience. Based on the evaluation, Colorado’s CIAC TLO program is 
recommended as a model for NYS to use to develop its own statewide fire service 
inclusive TLO program. The CIAC TLO program model proved to be the best match for 
NYS’ needs in both size and scope.  
A detailed implementation strategy is developed to address key stakeholder (fire 
service, law enforcement, intelligence community and the public) challenges. A working 
group is proposed to adapt and implement the CIAC TLO model to meet NYS needs 
while addressing NYS’ institutional (state and local) structures and the current fiscal 
climate.  
This thesis has demonstrated that instituting a NYS fire service inclusive TLO 
program will be a catalyst for evolution. The evolutionary process for the local fire 
service will not occur without challenges. A strategic inter-disciplinary approach that 
works to address the unique perspective of key stakeholder will increase the probability 




intelligence enterprise in New York State is a natural evolution of the fire service’s 
existing public safety mission. People and organizations are often slow to accept change, 
but disruptive thinking that works toward the common good will triumph. 
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